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 The role of the PLA in China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad has evolved 
over time primarily due to professionalization of the PLA and the bifurcation of military 
and civilian members of the Chinese government. During the Korean War, due to the 
interconnected relationship between the PLA and CCP and the unprofessional nature of 
the PLA, the PLA was unable to effectively express its views and operate, in effect, the 
PLA had to operate as a subordinate actor even during war. By the time of the 1995-
1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PLA was sufficiently decoupled from the CCP to develop 
its own early distinct views and interests and operate as a pressure group within the 
government to influence the crisis. The bifurcation of the military and the civilian sides of 
government combined with the growing professionalism of the PLA have reached their 
zenith currently as seen with regard to the South China Sea. These two factors have 
allowed the PLA, with its own corporate views and interests to operate not only as a 
pressure group within the Chinese government, but to ally with individuals and 
organizations outside of the formal bodies government bodies it is in to influence China’s 
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This Masters Thesis examines the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 
China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad. It uses three case studies: the Korean War, 
the 1995-6 (Third) Taiwan Strait Crisis (TSC), and the South China Sea (SCS). There is 
special emphasis on the importance of professionalism and bifurcation of elites in 
Chinese government as key drivers in the changing role of the PLA in China’s foreign 
policy and behavior abroad between the three case studies.  
The Korean War was the first foreign conflict the PLA was a principal actor in 
and the first conflict where the PLA was fighting on behalf of the nascent People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The early nature of the conflict allows for the analysis of civil-
military relations at a time when the PLA and civilian government operated under 
integrated leadership. This integrated leadership was a phenomenon of leadership 
marked by individuals who shared the same experiences and who were not strongly 
differentiated by specialized training, knowledge, or experience into ‘military’ and 
‘civilian’ men. 
 Those who would have been the closest to ‘civilian’ men had held military 
positions in the past; there was a close bond and regular interactions between the PLA 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, this integrated leadership, as this 
author shall call it, died with those men as their replacements have spent their careers in a 
completely different environment where professionalization and the bifurcation of elites 
in government have led to more specialized career men rather than revolutionary 
generalists. Professionalization meant that replacements only entered the military after 
receiving a military education and received promotions if they met professional military 
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standards rather than through only political connections. Bifurcation of the government 
meant that the career paths between those in the PLA, CCP, and State increasingly were 
differentiated from each other and fewer individuals were able to maintain a career in all 
three. Professionalization and the bifurcation of government happened over time though 
as is illustrated through the length of time and case studies this thesis examines. 
The 1995-6 TSC was the first major foreign crisis China faced following the rise 
of a civilian born-and-bred leadership with only the fading shadow of integrated 
leadership in the background. Because the old integrated leadership was essentially dead, 
there were no informal bonds to hold back the PLA. While Deng Xiaoping had started to 
institutionalize relations, especially between the Party and the Military, there were still 
not enough norms and rules to fully keep the military from exercising undue influence.1 
The breach in the unity of civilian leadership between those who at least originally 
favored a more moderate response to Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 and those that did not 
allowed the PLA to push the country to create the Third TSC. Civilian support for a 
stronger response only emerged after conservative civilian leaders and rivals of Jiang 
Zemin piled on and followed the PLA’s lead. 
The final case study on the SCS showcases the next evolutionary stage of civil-
military relations in China and the new modus operandi or mindset the PLA has adopted 
with regard to interacting with civilians, what this author will call corporate allegiance. 
The PLA, a corporate actor (corporate interests and attitudes), now has the ability to form 
alliances with sub-sets or certain segments of the CCP, State, businesses, and citizens to 																																																								
1 Deng’s attempts at regulating the PLA and its relationship with the Party. See Yu Bin, 
“The Fourth-Generation Leaders and the New Military Elite,” David M. Finkelstein and 
Kristen Gunness (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New 
Sea, M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.77-79. 
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achieve shared or mutually beneficial goals such as shifting China’s policy and behavior 
in the SCS. Their reasons may not be identical but their desired end goal is and they all 
benefit some how along the way. 
 Corporate allegiance differs from Conditional Compliance (an old theory of 
Chinese civil-military relations to be discussed later) as the PLA is not in a clean, clear 
two-actor negotiation (CCP and the PLA), but is working with certain segments of the 
Party, State, and non-governmental actors on mutually beneficial goals regardless of the 
actions of those they are not aligned with. This phenomenon is not unheard of in the 
world but is a first for civil-military relations in the PRC. 
The new modus operandi of the PLA is a natural evolution of its role in China’s 
foreign policy and behavior abroad specifically, and civil-military relations more 
generally, as a result of professionalism and the bifurcation of elites in China. Once a 
truly party-army composed of informally trained, barely educated peasants, the PLA is 
now the world’s largest military and is rapidly professionalizing and modernizing to 
defend China and what it sees as China’s interests. With regard to the South China Sea, 
the PLA has shown that the CCP is ‘not the only game in town’ though it does not 
preclude the PLA working with certain segments of the CCP.  
Not Your Parent’s China, Not Your Parent’s PLA: 
There are two audiences that need to be considered when discussing the 
importance of the topic of this thesis: the general foreign policy and defense 
establishment which has interest in China but not necessarily extensive training and the 
very small group of PLA and Chinese security experts. This thesis is geared in part 
towards both groups. For the former it provides context to the matters examined and does 
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not get too bogged down in minutia. For the latter it traces the evolution of the PLA with 
pertinent detail and creates a new theory for possible expansion in later works by this 
author or by the rest of the field. For both it reminds them of the importance of civil-
military relations in China and the effects it can have on China’s foreign policy and 
behavior abroad. Few studies focus on the role of the PLA at all in foreign policy and 
behavior abroad, in fact, the literature at large has often “either downplayed greatly or 
ignored [it] altogether”.2 Of those that do, even fewer focus on the interactions between 
military and civilian individuals and organizations. This study through tracing the 
evolution of civil-military relations in China shows the importance of them in China’s 
foreign policy and behavior abroad and what factors, bifurcation and professionalization, 
have driven their evolution. 
Due to the increasing bifurcation of the government and the increasing 
professionalization of the PLA, the field of civil-military relations in China must be 
updated. These two factors, in conjunction with the increasingly rapid changes within 
Chinese society and government, have led to a new reality of civil-military relations in 
China. Civil-military relations no longer exclusively mean CCP-PLA relations. They are 
increasing between the CCP, the State, businesses, and citizens (on the side the civil side) 
and the PLA (on the military side). 
The PLA has been given increased prominence in Chinese society and 
government due to rising nationalism and increasingly tense territorial and maritime 
disputes with neighbors and strategic tensions with the United States (US). At the same 
time, there has begun a surge of the State and State institutions while those of the CCP 																																																								
2 Michael D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking, RAND, 1998, p.2-3. 
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seem to be facing increasing pressure.3 As China’s economy and military have 
developed, the desire for its own ‘military-industrial complex’ and the desire to bring in 
successful businesspeople to work with the government, have led to businesses with 
strategic value to the Chinese government forming links with certain governmental 
organizations such as the National People’s Congress (NPC).4 Certain segments and 
individual members of civilian government, as well as business members with links with 
the military, are increasingly important sources of mutually beneficial lobbying and 
action that align nicely with the PLA’s preferences. 
While several theories have emerged over time to describe civil-military relations 
in China (which usually took civil-military relations as CCP-PLA relations) such as 
Symbiosis (Amos Perlemutter, William M. LeoGrande, David Shambaugh, etc.), 
Conditional Compliance (Ellis Joffe, James Mulvenon, and You Ji), and State Control 
(Andrew Scobell and David Shambaugh), no new theories have emerged in the past two 
or so decades. While each theory has contributed to our understanding of civil-military 
relations in China, each theory is often only useful for a few decades and whose utility 
drops as relations evolve.  
For example, symbiosis described civil-military relations in nearly exclusive 
party-army terms where dual membership was the norm. This theory was pertinent during 																																																								
3 Even with regard to control over the armed forces. See Lyman Miller, “The Political 
Implications of PLA Professionalism,” David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (ed.), 
Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: Swimming in a New Sea, M.E. Sharpe, 2007, 
p.140. 
4 China’s push for its own ‘military-industrial complex.’ See David Lague and Charlie 
Zhu, “Insight: China builds its own military industrial complex,” Reuters, September 16, 
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-idUSBRE88F0GM20120916. 
China bringing in more businesspeople from both SOEs and private companies. See 
Cheng Li, “The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling New Elites,” 
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2009, p.20-21. 
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the revolutionary period of the Communist movement in China before the PRC was 
founded and during the years after its founding when Mao effectively ruled. However, as 
State institutions were set up alongside CCP and PLA ones, as education and training 
requirements for each pillar led to ‘Experts’ increasingly winning out over ‘Reds,’ and as 
the old revolutionary guard began to retire and die, the theory’s relevance waned.  
The theory of Conditional Compliance grew out of the fall of Symbiosis. As 
membership and identity in the CCP, PLA, and State became increasingly differentiated 
and the old revolutionary fervor faded away, the three pillars of Chinese government had 
to negotiate a new way to operate now that the informal bonds that once governed their 
interactions were dead. The new way was termed Conditional Compliance. The PLA 
would by-and-large follow the lead of the CCP, and to a lesser extent the State, so long as 
the PLA was given more reasonable autonomy to run their own affairs. However, the 
State has gained more prominence since this theory was first proposed while the 
legitimacy of the CCP has taken a hammering in the last two decades. The fact that the 
PLA already has a great deal of the autonomy and resources it once sought also limits the 
utility of the theory now.  
The final main theory on civil-military relations in China, State Control, was 
perhaps proposed too early. State Control generally holds that as the power and 
legitimacy of the CCP declines and as the State gains more power and legitimacy that 
civil-military relations in China will more closely resemble civil-military relations in 
Western countries where the armed forces are under the exclusive control of the 
government. I say that State Control was perhaps proposed too early because, while civil-
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military relations in China may eventually end up there, the theory assumes a quick and 
steady decline in the power of the CCP.  
However, while the power of the State is rising, the CCP has defied experts 
predicting its imminent doom for decades.5 Xi Jinping has also reversed some of the 
decentralizing power efforts of his predecessors and has been attempting to increase the 
control of the Party once again which further challenges the underlying assumes of State 
Control.6 The theory of corporate allegiance is needed to explain civil-military relations 














5 David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198. 
6 Willy Lam, “Xi Jinping Forever: Is China’s increasingly powerful president angling to 
break tradition and extend his rule indefinitely?,” Foreign Policy, April 1, 2015, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/01/xi-jinping-forever-china-president-term-limits/. 
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     Literature Review 
As this thesis examines the evolution of civil-military relations in the PRC and 
their effect on foreign policy and behavior abroad, the literature review will first cover 
general civil-military relations followed by coverage of the literature on each case study: 
the Korean War, 1995-6 TSC, and the SCS. 
The PLA and Civil-Military Relations: 
 Historical primary and secondary source material in Chinese has been valuable 
for the study of civil-military relations in China, but such material, usually auto-
biographies of leaders and soldiers, rarely if ever has any objective analysis. State 
censorship, self-censorship, and repression mean that the overwhelming amount of 
analysis on civil-military relations in China, and even on the PLA generally, is written in 
English though uses Chinese source material. With the advent of the Internet, open-
source material produced by Chinese news websites has created a rapidly producing 
buffet of new Chinese-language sources though the authoritativeness of such sources is 
often debated among experts. Outlets associated with ministries (such as the State 
Oceanic Administration), provinces (such as Hainan), and the PLA (such as China 
Military Online and PLA Daily) have become more frequent and nuanced in their articles, 
reports, and commentaries. Their utility is mainly in offering details on certain current 
events or opinions of Chinese actors rather than cogent analysis of civil-military 
relations. Nonetheless, they showcase a broader and more diverse range of views than say 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on issues with an international aspect. Following the 
tradition of the literature, this thesis will be written in English and utilize English and 
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Chinese-language sources (some already translated by professionals) where applicable, as 
well as other language sources to create a holistic picture of each case study. 
Chinese civil-military relations and PLA studies (often considered one rather than 
two subfields due to their interconnected nature) are essentially the exclusive domain of 
scholars and experts associated with defense-related think-tanks and the US military. The 
Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, the China Maritime Studies 
Institute at the US Naval War College, the US Office of Naval Intelligence, and the 
RAND Corporation historically are the only institutions that regularly produce 
authoritative analytical material on the PLA.  
One of the most influential contributors, especially for the early study of the PLA, 
was Ellis Joffe (d. 2010). His insights, which helped shape the foreign conception of the 
PLA and its relationship with the CCP, are seen in his work The Chinese Army after Mao 
(1987) and perhaps best succinctly summed up by his 1996 article “Party-Army Relations 
in China: Retrospect and Prospect.” Michael D. Swaine’s The Military & Political 
Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (1992) provided early evidence of 
professionalism and the bifurcation of the military and civilian pillars of Chinese 
government during the shift from the Second to Third Generation of Chinese leadership. 
James C. Mulvenon’s Professionalism of the Senior Officer Corps: Trends and 
Implications (1997) and Andrew Scobell’s Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang 
Zemin (2000) illuminated the concrete changes within the PLA due to professionalism 
under Jiang Zemin.  
Perhaps the one consistent criticism that can be made about these otherwise 
exemplary works is due to no fault of the authors themselves. Due to the desire by China 
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to withhold much of the information about their military, information that other militaries 
such as the US routinely make available to the public, there was a lag between events and 
analysis about said events. Researchers, especially before this past decade, had to heavily 
rely on reports from foreign intelligence communities, personal interviews, and glimpses 
of internally published material from the PLA that non-PLA members were not even 
supposed to be able to access. With the advent of widespread Internet access, a growing 
number of individuals and organizations becoming involved in foreign policy and 
security affairs, and an increasingly vocal PLA, researchers in recent years have had 
quicker access to a wider variety of sources.  
 Historically, information on the organization, operations, and capabilities of the 
PLA have been limited due to China’s desire to withhold such information, particularly 
from foreign observers. Therefore, conferences like the one that resulted in The People’s 
Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0 (2002, ed. James C. Mulvenon 
and Andrew N.D. Yang) have been crucial in bringing experts together to produce a work 
that if attempted by one individual would have been impossible. Other large joint efforts, 
such as The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s 
Military (2008, ed. Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner) and The 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 2025 (2015, ed. Roy Kamphausen and David Lai) 
have allowed unparalleled examination of critical trends with the PLA. 
Note, works such as The Role of The Chinese Military in National Security 
Policymaking (1998, ed. Michael Swaine) already provide an in-depth examination of 
how the PLA interacts with the civilian side of government through the structure of 
official channels generally during the 1990s. While shorter updates, such as “China’s 
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Assertive Behavior Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign Crises (2012, Michael 
D. Swaine) have been made as the nature of civil-military interactions evolved since, this 
thesis will not focus heavily on the minutia of the structure of civil-military interactions 
but rather on the important factors during each case study that occurred both inside of and 
outside of the official structures.  
Works focusing exclusively on Chinese civil-military relations and the differences 
between the civilian and military pillars of Chinese government have been scarce, mostly 
limited to occasional articles, such as Andrew Scobell’s “China’s Evolving Civil-Military 
Relations: Creeping Guojiahua” (2005) and David Shambaugh’s “China’s Military 
Views the World: Ambivalent Security,” (1999/2000). One of the only books exclusively 
on China’s civil-military relations is Civil-Military Relations in Today’s China: 
Swimming in a New Sea (2007, edited by David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness). 
This work analyzes every aspect of civil-military relations in China though says little 
about the specific conflicts and crises the PLA has been involved in or will likely be in 
the future on civil-military relations. Unfortunately, relatively little has been done to 
analyze the PLA and civil-military relations in China by using the PLA’s conquest of 
Tibet and Xinjiang or its wars with non-US adversaries such as India and Vietnam.  
Korean War: 
The literature on China’s intervention in the Korean War and civil-military 
relations during this time have evolved as more Chinese-, Russian-, and Korean-language 
sources have become available. In the years immediately following the armistice the 
literature was dominated by American authors and based predominantly on Western 
military sources (T.R. Fehrenbach’s This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness and 
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Albert Biderman’s March to Calumny: The Story of American POW’s in the Korean 
War). As a result of this limited access to and use of sources, the initial literature 
reflected the limited sight and biases of their sources. 
Following this initial rash of books and articles, American academia started to 
release its own more sympathetic account of China’s decision to intervene in the Korean 
War. Allen S. Whiting’s China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War 
can be seen as a classic example of the argument that China, caught off guard by the start 
of the war and feeling under threat from the approaching UN force, intervened to protect 
its own security. This literature has the appearance of a push back from the arguments of 
the initial literature that reflected closer conclusions to those held by the US government. 
Civil-military relations during the time were barely touched which gave off the 
impression that they were of little importance.  
The late 1970s and 1980s saw a surge of new work on the subject as US 
documents were released through both the Foreign Relations of the United States and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division volumes. Chinese sources also began to emerge 
at this time as the political climate in China began to ease following the death of Mao and 
the downfall of the Gang of Four. China began to release some selected volumes of 
Chinese leaders’ works (Mao, Peng Dehuai, and Nie Rongzhen) beginning in the 1980s 
and on into the 1990s. The accounts of ordinary Chinese troops also began to spread 
primarily through interviews and memoirs.  
This wave of releases began to change the standard narrative of China’s decision 
to intervene. Russell Spur’s Enter the Dragon: China’ Undeclared War Against the U.S. 
in Korea, 1950-1951 argued there was division in the Chinese leadership over the 
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decision to intervene with Mao more ready to contemplate intervention than those around 
him. The importance of the principal leaders of the PRC, the Soviet Union (USSR), and 
North Korea (DPRK) in the war became more apparent. 
The 1990s saw another surge of works thanks to the release of more documents 
from former Soviet archives. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War by 
Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Littai and Mao, Stalin and the Korean 
War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s by Shen Zhihua (translated by Neil 
Silver) are prominent examples. Both works wove compelling narratives about the close, 
but not necessarily smooth, relations between the principal leaders on the communist side 
as they planned the war. Because of the greater availability of Russian sources as well as 
the placement of the Korean War as near the ‘start’ of the Cold War, some literature 
(China and the United States: A New Cold War History by Xiaobing Li and Hongshan 
Li) and document collection websites (Cold War International History Project by the 
Wilson Center) began to discuss the Korean War as a more contentious period of intra-
Communist politics.  
Perhaps the most influential and most cited work on China in the Korean War was 
China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation by 
Chen Jian. This work established the now relatively standard narrative that China’s 
decision to enter the Korean War was due to broader considerations than the security of 
the Sino-Korean border. Another influential work which argued for the importance of 
Mao Zedong’s personal beliefs and feelings in China’s decision to officially intervene 
was Shu Guang Zhang’s Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953.  
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English-language works on Koreans experiences (South or North) have been 
rather scarce compared with those focusing on American or Chinese experiences, though 
works such as The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning and The War for Korea, 
1950-1951: They Came From the North by Allan R. Millett and Voices from the Korean 
War: Personal Stories of American, Korean, and Chinese Soldiers by Richard Peters and 
Xiaobing Li have incorporated them more into the mainstream narrative. The inclusion of 
Korean experiences on both sides have shed further light on how contentious alliances on 
both sides were. 
The 2000s brought with them the latest and perhaps last wave of new substantial 
literature on the Korean War, at least until China and North Korea allow access to the 
archives they have kept to themselves. These works use military sources help to expose 
the gaps between the CCP and the PLA, especially between Mao and his military leaders, 
and reveal as fiction the previous CCP narratives about the Korean War and its 
interactions with the PLA. 
These works include writings from PLA generals translated and edited by 
Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu conveniently called Mao’s Generals 
Remember Korea. The book China’s Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive by 
Xiaobing Li and the book China’s Military Intervention in Korea: Its Origins and 
Objectives by David Tsui (also known as Yerong Xu) are also in this latest but important 
wave of literature on the Korean War. The leap in understanding of the Korean War, the 
relations between allies, and the civil-military relations within each country, has shown 
the detrimental effect of governments restricting public access to archives and other 
sources out of concern for political rather than security considerations.  
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Despite the proliferation of works on the Korean War, most of the literature still 
focuses on the conflict in historical terms rather than as a political case study to advance 
theories about the PLA or civil-military relations in China. The revolutionary nature of 
Chinese politics, particularly the nexus of communist strongmen and the integrated nature 
of China’s communist leadership, is usually just touched on in passing. Using the Korean 
War as a case study to analyze civil-military relations in China remains a relatively 
untapped resource. Despite the wide range of the PLA’s activities including governing 
newly conquered regions; farming; policing tall buildings to prevent suicide jumps; and 
being “volunteers,” the relationship between the military and the civilian government at 
home or abroad has not been discussed much when looking at this era of history.  
1995-6 TSC: 
 Since this event ‘only’ occurred about 20 years ago, there is much less literature 
on it than on the Korean War. Its ‘youth’ similarly limits the number and diversity of 
sources in any language that can be used for analysis. For example, the authoritative 
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) archive series currently only goes up to 
the 1988. The increasingly sensitive political climate in China is also hampering access to 
sources from archives in China.7 What sources researchers are able to access generally 
result in individual articles rather than books. The few books, such as Across the Taiwan 
Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis edited by Suisheng Zhao, 
present many of the contemporary narratives (some still clearly politically driven) on 
what led to the crisis itself. But this work lacks a coherent argument or narrative and is 																																																								
7 Muara Cunningham, “Denying Historians: China’s Archives Increasingly Off-Bounds,” 




riddled with redundancy as each chapter author rehashes the same details with slightly 
different personal takes.  
However, the relatively unknown China Politic and Taiwan Crisis: China’s 
Leadership Succession and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis by Jianhai Bi does 
manage to present a coherent argument. It claims China’s ongoing leadership transition 
between Deng and Jiang and the resulting elite political battles between Jiang and those 
seeking to supplant his still insecure leadership were the source of China’s sudden shift 
towards initiating the 1995-1996 TSC.  
 Because the 1995-6 TSC occurred at a time when a free media environment had 
established itself in Hong Kong and Taiwan, media outlets from these places were able to 
document the crisis as it evolved, with much of their work still being available to the 
public after they digitized it. The South China Morning Post, in particular, must be noted 
for its thorough and often insightful reporting on the crisis and its relation to ongoing 
politics in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington DC.  
SCS: 
 As this case is an ongoing event and has various possible dates of origin, the 
literature here is even more nebulous, and to date no attempt has ever been made to draw 
up a ‘list’ its literature. Part of the problem is China has tried to avoid defining its 
position, what it is doing, and what it hopes to achieve. Any action China has taken has 
become news, but its actions often have not been looked at in-depth in the context of its 
history in the region. Despite the little attention paid it, the role of the PLA and of civil-
military relations in China’s policy and behavior in the SCS might be two of the most 
crucial elements to understanding China’s behavior in the past and in the future. 
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 Few works of any length, outside of occasional foreign governmental reports 
focusing on larger issues, have emerged. Those that have such as Jing Huang’s and 
Andrew Billo’s (ed.) Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough 
Waters often focused solely on the legal disputes in the SCS rather than analyzing the 
more consequential physical activities that are changing the ‘facts on the ground’ such as 
the creation of artificial islands. With the ‘facts on the ground’ changing further and 
China’s decision to ignore the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Article 7 ruling on the Philippines’ case against it, many of those works have 
lost much of their value. These more consequential activities are led and performed by 
the PLA, China’s maritime law enforcement agencies, and China’s maritime militias.  
Because of the complexity of the physical Chinese activities in the SCS and the 
relative lack of interest and expertise in naval issues in mainstream academia, the experts 
are primarily from or associated with think-tanks and militaries, especially the US 
military. Though their works are primarily in the form of articles (such as “Irregular 
Forces at Sea: “Not “Merely Fisherman” – Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia” 
by Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy) rather than their complete books or long-
term studies (such as Lyle J. Goldstein’s Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge 
and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities and Peter 
Dutton’s (ed.) Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and 
International Law in the Maritime Commons), they offer exceptional expertise that has 
been often ignored by academia.  
The main shortfall of relying so heavily on military-focused analysts, however, is 
that the literature can focus disproportionately on difficult to parse, though important, 
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technical aspects of military hardware rather than on those that use them or the civilians 
that they interact with. The producers of this often technologically dense material have 
occasionally themselves commented on this as a point of concern. 
Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific is an 
example of a book that has contributed to the debate amongst the general public rather 
than amongst experts. Unlike the two previous cases (Korean War and 1995-6 TSC), 
works (both written and visual) made for public consumption in some cases actually 
preempted the expert literature on the subject (if the late 2000s are taken as the ‘start’ of 
the case). The 1997 James Bond movie Tomorrow Never Dies features a potential 
conflict between China and a foreign navy in the SCS and even references the disputed 
claims between China and other claimant states (in this case Vietnam). The 1996 Ian 
Slater book WWIII: South China Sea similarly seemed to be ahead of the experts in the 
field at producing works on this then future, now current hot spot regardless of their 
intended audience or their intended purpose of entertainment.  
These aforementioned works along with relatively routine in-depth reporting from 
popular news outlets such as The New York Times, Reuters, BBC, and CNN, have meant 
that ‘non-expert’ works have had a significant effect on the perception of the SCS case by 
experts and the general public alike. On the other hand, works by experts have been 
relatively late in coming with most only starting to appear around 2014. Their delay 
limited their ability to influence the initial perceptions of the case by other experts, the 
general public and, perhaps most importantly, politicians. 
In the continuing relative absence of in-depth, full-length works by experts 
exclusively on the SCS, the ‘expert literature’, traditionally made up of lengthy books is, 
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as of now, only made up of chapters on technological capabilities in large books on the 
PLA’s modernization and development that reference, sometimes not even by name, the 
SCS. To date most (in terms of pure numbers) of the ‘expert literature’ has been confined 
to works by think-tanks with the Center for Strategic and International Studies being 
among the foremost with its Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative and ChinaPower 
initiative for regular articles and analytical tools.  
While many of these works produced by think-tanks have been very good, their 
making up the overwhelming bulk of works on the SCS is worrisome.8 Given the 
presence of former members of governments, militaries, and the private sector in think-
tanks and the importance of these organizations in shaping government policy, they could 
be considered a new part of the ‘military-industrial complex’ (perhaps now the ‘military-
industrial-information complex’) with all the potential problems that follow as a result of 
being apart of said complex. 
Conclusion: 
 Though the literature covered is disparate, these three case studies do show the 
evolution of the PLA in China’s foreign policy and behavior aboard over time and how 
the degree of PLA professionalism and bifurcation of government has been critical in the 
PLA’s and why and how it evolved. The following chapters will illustrate these impacts 
on the past, present, and future. 
 
																																																								
8 Concerns about the objectivity and motive of research institutes. See Eric Lipton, 
Brooke Williams, and Nicholas Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think 




Professionalism and Bifurcation: From Party-Army to 
Professional Army 
Like most militaries, China’s military often views the events facing their country 
quite differently from the civilian government.9 While integrated leadership was the norm 
in the revolutionary days of the government, the line between who was ‘military’ and 
who was ‘civilian’ was blurred but still extant.10 Since the end of integrated leadership in 
China, there has been an increasing distinction between the civilian and military pillars of 
Chinese government (CCP & State and PLA, respectively) due to an increasing 
bifurcation of elites and professionalization.  
Professionalization here refers to the professionalization of the PLA as a military 
force particularly through professionalized military education (PME), a promotion system 
based on military criteria, and reduced political interference.11 This chapter will also 
briefly touch on the negative influence of political interference in military affairs or the 
politicization of the armed forces, commonly viewed as the greatest obstacle to 
professionalization, during the development of the PLA. Bifurcation of elites refers to the 
evolution of distinct elites primarily between the PLA and CCP and to a lesser extent the 
																																																								
9 Howard J. Wiarda, Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: 
A Clash of Cultures, Lexington Books, 2011, p.103-149. Patricia Cook, “A Profession 
Like No Other,” George Lucas (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Military Ethics, Routledge, 
2015, p.32-45. 
10 Line over between military leaders and Mao and his political followers over the issues 
such as the Maoist military ethic. See: William W. Whitson with Chen-Hsia Huang, The 
Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1973, p.xx, p.xxi, p.xxii, p.29-30, p.95-100, p.416-435, and p.436-457. 
11 James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps, RAND, 
1997, p.ix-xv. 
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State as well.12 Bifurcation occurs through the retirement or death of the old integrated 
leadership/elite and the separate training of a new elite.  
These distinctions between the PLA and the rest of government would lead to the 
PLA developing corporate allegiance. Without professionalization and bifurcation the 
subordinate role the PLA would play during the Korean War would be the only role it 
ever played. Without professionalization and bifurcation the Chinese government would 
remain frozen in the mid-1900s. However because of the effects of these two factors, the 
Chinese Communist movement went from being a single elite group with little 
differentiation to several separate groups with relatively little in common when it comes 
to views, attitudes, education, training, life experience, capabilities, and roles. These 
distinctions between the PLA and the rest of government would lead to the PLA 
developing corporate allegiance and playing a greater role in China’s foreign policy and 
behavior abroad. 
Path from Armed Wing of the Party to the Push for Professional Autonomy: 
From its inception as a guerilla party army in 1927 to the beginning of its 
transition to a de facto state army (a party army with the secondary responsibility to 
protect the state from external threats) in 1949, the PLA was always at war. Due to this 
constant warfare “a regular system of education and training never really emerged during 
the revolutionary period.”13 With the establishment of the PRC, the PLA needed to 
																																																								
12 Overview on Party-State relations and their different perspectives. See Zheng 
Yongnian and Weng Cuifen, “The Development of China’s Formal Political Structures,” 
Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge Bekkevold (ed.), China in the Era of Xi Jinping, Georgetown 
University Press, 2016, p.33-37. 
13 Ibid, p.24. The PLA was also responsible for many non-military related tasks such as 
settling new lands and developing them, as civilians were unable to do so. See James Z. 
Gao, “The Call of the Oases: The “Peaceful Liberation” of Xinjiang, 1949-1953,” Jeremy 
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evolve from a poorly educated, infantry army to a more advanced force capable of 
protecting the PRC from threats by land, sea, and air. Soon the PLA Navy (PLAN) and 
PLA Air Force (PLAAF) were established as well as specialized schools for training 
personnel from the different branches of the PLA.  
After the PLA was called into subdue the Cultural Revolution, the next few years 
were spent “rebuilding and restoring education and training in the PLA as it had been 
prior to the radicalization and destruction of the Cultural Revolution.”14 The true costs of 
the Cultural Revolution and the politicization of the PLA became evident with the 
disastrous 1979 invasion of Vietnam.15 The PLA realized that a widespread lack of 
properly trained troops harmed their ability to fight.16 By the early 1980s only about 10% 
of all PLA officers had graduated from either a junior college or four-year degree 
program. 17 Schools were eventually reopened and technical knowledge emphasized 
again, and the amount of political education required by the CCP in PLA’s PME was 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (ed.), Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the 
People’s Republic of China, Harvard University Press, 2007, p.195-203. In effect the 
PLA was the organization that had the best chance of carrying out, some of the more 
outlandish ideas of the CCP. Their great utility, therefore, led to them being spread thin 
by the wide-ranging demands of the Party leaving little time for proper military 
education. 
14 Ibid, p.31. Despite the chaos and purges that wracked the country, as an institution, the 
PLA was the only relatively intact organization with power left after the Cultural 
Revolution. See Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p.293. 
15 David Stout, “The Last Time China Got Into a Fight With Vietnam, It Was a Disaster,” 
Time, May 15, 2014, http://time.com/100417/china-vietnam-sino-vietnamese-war-south-
china-sea/. 
16 Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict Between China 
and Vietnam, 1979-1991, The University of North Carolina Press, 2015, p.167. 
17 Cheng Li, “The New Military Elite: Generational Profile and Contradictory Trends,” 
David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Today’s 
China: Swimming in a New Sea, M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.55. 
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reduced.18 By the mid-1990s 70% of all PLA officers had graduated from either a junior 
college or four-year degree program, a major transformation.19 
The creation of the National Defense University (NDU) enhanced the “jointness” 
of PLA identity by being the first institution whereby members from across the various 
branches of the PLA could be educated and develop new ideas together in the same 
place.20 Almost all senior commanders have passed through the NDU at some point in 
their careers.21 The changes in structure and capabilities are not the only reason for a shift 
in the PLA’s perspective. Like militaries the world over, the PLA has developed a 
‘military mind.’22 The PLA’s job as a fighting force means the PLA has different 
responsibilities from that of say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA).23 The military 
nature of a PLA career also attracts different potential employees. The PME then further 
weeds out unwilling or incapable potential soldiers while simultaneously forging a 
unique corporate identity amongst those that the PLA allows to become full-fledged 																																																								
18 Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics, Cambridge University Press, 
2000, p.31. 
19 Cheng Li, “The New Military Elite: Generational Profile and Contradictory Trends,” 
David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in Today’s 
China: Swimming in a New Sea, M.E. Sharpe, 2007, p.55. 
20 Ibid, p.33. 
21 Ibid, p.34. 
22 Andrew Scobell, “Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China’s Peaceful Rise?,” 
Parameters, Summer 2009, p.5-6. 
23 Even though the PLA is involved in foreign affairs (mainly the MoFA’s purview), 
there are differing attitudes between the PLA and MoFA and their interactions are 
marked by little to no communication and coordination. See Linda Jakobson, “Domestic 
Actors and the Fragmentation of China’s Foreign Policy,” Robert S. Ross and Jo Inge 
Bekkevold (ed.), China in the Era of Xi Jinping, Georgetown University Press, 2016, 
p.141-142 and p.144. The MoFA has been losing influence in China’s foreign 
policymaking process to the PLA with the MoFA being reduced to ‘petty diplomacy’ and 
a spokesperson role rather than a contributor to Chinese strategy. See Jing Sun, “Growing 
Diplomacy, Retreating Diplomats – How the Chinese Foreign Ministry has been 
Marginalized in Foreign Policymaking,” Journal of Contemporary China, November 7, 
2016, p.1-15. 
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members.24 The professionalization of the PLA and the bifurcation of the government 
further strengthen a sense of corporate identity by throwing into sharp relief the gap 
between the PLA and many others by in terms of institutional interests and views.25   
The 1991 Gulf War as well as the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the 1995-6 
TSC sent the PME of the PLA along a new advanced path. It needed to handle the 
advanced technology and integrated operations that were becoming a key part of modern 
warfare.26 The PLA was shocked by the capabilities of the United States, and knew they 
would need an overhaul if they were to come into conflict.27 The PLA had already 
attempted to move on from a ‘people’s war’ mentality to one that saw that “more 
advanced technology, better connectivity, and improved command and control… [as] 
necessary if the PLA were to prevail in modern war in the latter part of the twentieth 
century.”28  
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25 Institutional interests across the PLA and its varying services have helped the PLA 
conceive of itself as a discrete group within government. See Isaac B. Kardon and Phillip 
C. Saunders, “Reconsidering the PLA as an Interest Group,” Phillip C. Saunders and 
Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking, 
Stanford University Press, 2015, p.44-50. 
26 Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Defense Establishment: The Hard Lessons of Incomplete 
Modernization,” Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel (ed.), The 
Lessons of History: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army at 75, Strategic Studies 
Institute, July 2003, p.49-50. 
27 Ellis Joffe, “China’s Military Build Up: Beyond Taiwan?,” Andrew Scobell and Larry 
M. Wortzel (ed.), Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s 
Liberation Army, Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006, p.36-37. James Mulvenon, 
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Simulation in the Chinese Military Training Revolution,” Roy Kamphausen, Andrew 
Scobell, and Travis Tanner (ed.), The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and 
Education in China’s Military, Strategic Studies Institute, September 2008, p.49. 
28 Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends Its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes 
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A result of this focus on technology has been the on the books, double-digit 
budget increases for more than two decades for the PLA in part to pay for such material 
capabilities.29  
Figure 1 China's Official Defense Budget (2005-2015) (http://www.janes.com/article/49742/china-s-defence-
budget-more-than-doubles-since-2008). 
The actual size of China’s budget and its annual increases is actually much higher than its 
officially stated budget, and there is a wide range of estimates for its annual budget.30 
																																																								
29 Craig Caffrey, “China’s defence budget more than doubles since 2008,” HIS Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, March 5, 2015, http://www.janes.com/article/49742/china-s-defence-
budget-more-than-doubles-since-2008. 
30 ChinaPower,“What does China really spend on its military?,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2016, http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/.  
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Figure 2 China's Defense Spending: Official Budget and Outside Estimates (2008-2015) 
(http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/) 
However, even if China’s defense budget was as small as the government claims, its large 
annual increases, have allowed the PLA to make great strides in acquiring new equipment 
(such as fifth generation stealth jets and aircraft carriers) as well as better wages and 
benefits. Wages increases and better benefits allow the PLA to attract better potential 
recruits and retain skilled, existing members, though there is still stiff competition with 
the private sector.31 This competition with the private sector may, however, be mitigated 
at least when it comes to technological development as more and more laws increasingly 
integrate the PLA with both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private, but strategically 
valuable, firms. While they are not technically on the PLA payroll, they in effect work for 
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Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, Strategic Studies Institute, 
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them.32    
System of PLA Promotion: 
The hierarchy and promotion system within the PLA has changed drastically 
since its inception as a peasant army. Mao’s death and Deng’s fading from politics finally 
opened the way for the PLA to regularize and codify its system of promotion, thereby 
limiting, though not eliminating, political interference in the promotional system.33 The 
relevance of political patronage in Chinese military politics also declined as a universal 
system of promotion based on objective job-related criteria took hold.  
The announcement in December 2016 by the PLA that promotion of officers will 
be based on military rank is another step in the direction of military promotion system 
based on militarily relevant criteria.34 In the past Chinese officers had both ranks and 
grades with the later being associated with political power. One source of the power of 
political commissars was that they held equal grades with unit commanders even if they 
had lower ranks.35 Historically, when grades mattered more than ranks, there was greater 
political interference in the military such as during the Cultural Revolution when the rank 
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system was actually abolished.36 The fact that the military has stated its goal is a “rank-
centered military officer system” shows a further break with the revolutionary past.37  
Party Control and Influence within the PLA: 
Party control of the PLA is not what is once was. The effects of the 
professionalization of the PLA and the bifurcation of government have weakened the 
traditional tools of the CCP to maintain control and spread its influence. It is often said 
that the PLA is a party-army, and that is indeed true, but it is not as true as it once was.38 
As the revolutionary leaders retired or died and as PLA professional reforms began, the 
number of individuals in both the CCP and PLA with substantial experience and 
influence in both groups, decreased.39 The total number of members of the PLA who are 
also members of the CCP has decreased over the years as well.40 This trend is partially 
due to the CCP restricting the number of PLA members who can become CCP members 
and restricting the number of positions reserved for the PLA in organizations such as the 
NPC.41 Leaders such as Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, in addition to Thirteenth Party 
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Congress in 1987, also endorsed moves that had the effect of weakening the Party control 
by advocating a separation between the Party and the State.42  
While about 95% of officers are also CCP members, only about 20% of enlisted 
members have been able or willing to join.43 Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that a 
growing number of younger members of the PLA attain CCP membership for job 
benefits rather than a personal desire to be apart of the CCP.44 It seems likely that as more 
members of the PLA rise through the ranks under professionalized conditions, they will 
increasingly question the relevance of such political connections or party concerns to 
military personnel considerations. Unfortunately for the CCP in modern times, the old 
integrated leadership never thoroughly institutionalized strong control of the military by 
the Party. When the integrated leadership, who had commanded the military primarily 
through personal connections died out, that high level of control deteriorated as well.45 
Leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have had to in effect re-negotiate the 
relationship between the PLA and the rest of the government as well as build up support 
within the PLA by promoting more high-ranking military leaders and adopting their 
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views as their own, though Hu was less successful at this than Jiang.46 Regardless of 
these moves, the end result has been weaker control of the military than the old integrated 
leadership commanded and less than the ‘absolute loyalty’ that the CCP routinely 
states.47 Ironically enough, these two leaders oversaw the State gaining more long-term 
control over the military through institutional measures, such as the 1997 National 
Defense Law and the 2006 Defense White Paper, while the control by the Party largely 
atrophied.48 Xi has had greater success in gaining control of the military again through 
similar tactics as his predecessors in addition to pushing through organizational reforms, 
but only time will tell if Xi is a new trend in China’s leadership or an anomaly.49 If Xi’s 
power were to take a hit, he would likely lose some of the power he has gained in the 
military, especially that which he gained through fear. 
The Party, traditionally and currently, maintains part of its control via high-level 
organizations, such as the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC). However, these 
organizations are run in parallel with the their State counterparts, such as the State CMC, 
with often identical membership which does weaken the influence of a Party organization 
if it has to have a State counterpart. The very fact that key CCP organizations are only 
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able to legally command the PLA through their State run counterparts is telling about the 
shifting of power away increasingly from the Party. One example of the shifting power of 
the CCP is the case of the CCP National Security Commission (NSC) which Chinese 
observers now say, that in order to act as it was set up to, “has to seek a legal foundation” 
and become a State organization.50  
Regardless, the CMC (CCP and State) has long been considered the pinnacle of 
the military hierarchy. Though its importance has diminished at least slightly since the 
end of integrated leadership and the rise of consensus leadership, it is still one of the most 
critical military organizations.51 It is traditionally led by an individual who is 
simultaneously serving as General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC and its 
other members also being members of the CCP.52 It can then be said that the CMC (CCP 
and State) is a source of control over the military for both the CCP and State as they are 
both traditionally represented by the Chairman of the CMC. Though just because the 
head of the Party and State chairs the CMC does not mean they are actually all that 
involved in its meetings.  
According to Michael Swaine, Jiang Zemin reportedly did not attend many of the 
CMC meetings, choosing instead to send an aide to attend in his stead.53 His lack of 
military experience and relevant knowledge meant that when it came to defense, Jiang 																																																								
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“almost certainly follow[ed] the lead of the top PLA elite.”54 Jiang’s predecessor actually 
faired worse in the CMC, whose office he rarely would ever even use, and in his 
relationships with military leaders, who he rarely ever interacted with outside of CMC 
meetings.55 Even with his attendance in CMC meetings, two of his supposed 
subordinates, General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong, effectively subverted power 
from Hu Jintao, especially during the his second term (2007-2012).56 It was during this 
time that generals “began to have a bigger say in national security issues” due to Hu’s 
weakness.57 Xi Jinping has faired better than Jiang or Hu in the CMC though that is 
partly because he shares many of their views and supports many of their policy 
preferences. Xi seems so close to the military that in 2014 he even said: “I, too, am a 
military man who has become a cadre [in civilian departments].”58 How effective a 
source of Party control can the CMC be if the man who heads the Party says he was a 
military man first who only later became a real Party man?59 In fact, Xi almost became a 
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‘military man.’ For several years he served as the personal assistant to China’s Defense 
Minister Geng Biao who advised him to stay in the PLA for his career.60 While Xi left in 
1982 to “go down to the countryside,” his experiences with the military and those in it 
clearly made a strong impression on him.61 The stronger focus on the military with its 
own needs and interests that Xi has displayed in comparison to his predecessors is further 
shown through his travels. While Jiang Zemin did visit two different military regions 
during his first year on the CMC, Xi visited six of the different military regions during 
his first year on the CMC.62  Xi’s visits to military facilities since he gained all three top 
leadership positions have been so frequently that in 2013 he visited more military bases 
than any other world leader with the exception of Kim Jun-un which says something 
about his preoccupation with the military.63 
If the chair chooses not attend many of its meetings or has relatively little 
knowledge or experience about military affairs (such as Jiang, Hu, and to a lesser extent 
Xi), it is important to understand those remaining members who do attend all the CMC 
meetings and do have the training and education to contribute substantively to their 
discussions and decisions. As has been the case for these three aforementioned leaders, 
those same remaining members have been career military men. The staffs that work for 
them and the departments they oversee, which provide them with their intelligence and 																																																																																																																																																																					
03/14/c_132233072.htm. Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, was actually solider and later became a 
famous singer in the PLA for years and once held the rank of major general. See Maria 
Puente, “Who is Chinese first lady Peng Liyuan?,” The USA Today, June 6, 2013, 
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perform all military operations, are also career military individuals. They have been and 
continue to be products of China’s PME and increasingly professional system.64 While 
the CMC (CCP and State) is a source of Party control, as well as State control, it is also a 
direct source of power for the PLA to influence the head of the CCP and the PRC.65 As 
an institution, it is simultaneous a Party, State, and Military organization; however, it is 
overwhelming composed of professional, career military men who at some point in their 
lives joined the CCP. Taking into account this membership reality must alter the view of 
the CMC as a one-way source of Party control over the military. At best, it can be 
considered a two-way source of influence between the Party and State with the PLA. As 
the PLA has gained the ability to ally with civilians, including Party leaders, and use their 
support to push forward mutually beneficial goals, remember that the Party itself is not a 
monolithic organization, has had splits within the leadership in the past, and sections of it 
are open to influence and alliances with the PLA, will be important.66  
Further evidence about the importance of top CCP, State, and PLA positions 
relative to one another are the actions of the few men who have held these positions. 
While Mao Zedong let Liao Shaoqi be President of China for years, he continuously held 
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onto the top Party and military positions. When Deng Xiaoping led the overthrow of 
Mao’s chosen successor Hua Guofeng, he chose neither the top CCP nor State position to 
take for himself, but the more critical top military position of Chairman of the CMC. 
During Deng’s first two attempts at setting up a successor, neither time did he give them, 
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the top military position. Deng allowed them to have the 
top Party and State positions to test them, but kept the top military position for himself in 
case he felt he needed to remove them, which he did. When Deng’s third and final 
attempted successor, Jiang Zemin, was being set up, he was only given the top Party 
position at first, then the top State, and later the top military position.67 As Jiang Zemin 
was transferring leadership of China to Hu Jintao, Jiang chose to hold onto the top 
military position for two more years while Hu, the President of the PRC and General 
Secretary of the CCP, had to make do with the number two military position.68 When Hu 
Jintao was transferring the of leadership of China to Xi Jinping, Hu tried and failed to 
pull the same move as Jiang had done to him and give up his Party and State positions 
while keeping the leadership of the military. Had he had greater support within the 
military leadership he likely would have succeeded, but that leadership preferred Xi, so 
Xi succeed Hu without delay.69 While there have been three top positions in China for 
decades, one for each of the three main pillars of government (CCP, State, and PLA), 
when Xi Jinping decided to create a new fourth position, it was another military position 																																																								
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he chose to create.70 Arguably no one understands the relative power of the three pillars 
of China than the few men who have led them. Their clear actions favoring the top 
military position over the others illustrates the true power of the military in China’s 
leadership and especially in leadership transitions.  
While the leadership of organizations that have some level of oversight of the 
PLA by people who could be considered ‘Party people’ is not insignificant, these 
organizations set the general direction of the PLA (which is influenced by heavy 
lobbying from the PLA as well as its allies), they usually do not micro-manage the 
sprawling PLA or the equally sprawling paramilitary organizations the PLA is 
increasingly training, arming, and commanding.71 In cases such as the 1988 decision to 
shoot first during seizure of physical features in the SCS claimed by Vietnam and the 
decision and operation to seize Mischief Reef in 1994, their control was limited, and in 
the later case so was their awareness of the operation. Today even high-level Party 
organizations or organizations led by people who might be considered Party or State 
people seem to only be able to chart the general direction Chinese forces take and 																																																								
70 The fact that the new position was Commander-in-Chief and Xi appeared wearing 
military fatigues indicates that he wants deeper military power than his predecessors have 
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respond to moves made ‘on the waves’ by the PLA and paramilitary forces heavily 
influenced by the PLA after the fact.72 In fact, effective control and oversight by Party or 
State people (civilians) are so bad that it led the authoritative study China’s Incomplete 
Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army by 
RAND and presented to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 
2015 to state that the “Chinese armed forces are characterized by extremely weak civilian 
control and an almost total absence of oversight.”73 Only time will tell of Xi’s enhanced 
control at the operational level as Commander-in-Chief is an illusion or reality; however, 
given the above mentioned history of such control and that he cannot use the Ministry of 
National Defense (MoND) for command and control (C2) and he is the only civilian in 
the chain of command, it does not look especially promising.74 Xi can theoretically look 
to the CCP’s traditional sources of influence, but even those are weaker than they appear. 
Two sources of the CCP’s power and influence within the PLA were traditionally 
the political work system and political commissars. The political work system has been in 
decline for years. After a short increase in political work following the less than ‘absolute 
loyalty’ demonstrated by the military during the protests focused around Tiananmen 
Square and the delayed military response to calls to use violence, the amount of time 
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devoted to political education and work with the PLA continued its previously declining 
trajectory as it devoted more time towards improving war fighting capabilities.75  
The importance of political commissars, who as a source of party control “has 
never been as strong as it was made out to be,” has seen a similar decline over the years.76 
Gone are the days when political commissars were “party representatives.”77 Now 
political commissars are overwhelmingly professional members of the PLA who happen 
to deal with political affairs.78 Most commissars are in fact PLA officers who were just 
assigned to be commissars at one point in their careers rather than party members who 
actively sought the position.79 The ability of political commissars to channel the CCP’s 
influence in the military is further harmed due to the amount of political training that 
commissars receive throughout the PLA being uneven. While some higher-level 
commissars take some courses from a PLA political college, such as the PLA Xi’an 
Political College, at the company level political commissars generally do not even have 
any special political training.80 
As the PLA began to professionalize, the role of political commissars changed to 
mainly managing the unit morale, not unlike military chaplains within Western 																																																								
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professional militaries.81 The reduction in political work for the PLA, the evolving role of 
political commissars as well as the type of person who would become a political 
commissar and how they are trained were natural consequences of the increased emphasis 
on professionalization as well as problems with political commissars.82 Based on this 
evidence it seems reasonable to say that even members of the PLA charged with CCP 
related duties have accepted or are at least strongly influenced by PLA corporate identity 
and its associated training, education, skills, perspectives, and interests.83 This reality 
means that perhaps the primary agents charged with CCP influence throughout most of 
the military structure have been compromised. 
Party control through lower level organizations has been and remains similarly 
plagued by weakening Party control and incomplete civilian control. At the municipal 
and county level the party secretaries of those military sub-districts as first party 
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secretaries are responsible not to civilian leaders at the level above them but to the 
military authorities at the level above them (county to municipal and municipal to 
provincial).84 These first party secretaries therefore must keep in mind that their 
performances please their military superiors with their different set of views, interests, 
and career history. The military members they work with, however, have no such 
restraint on them as they are not evaluated in the same way by their civilian superiors.85 
Even the mixed (civilian and military) provincial defense mobilization commissions do 
not provide much respite to civilian leaders working with members of the military as 
these report to the regional defense mobilization commissions which are made up entirely 
of military officers who outrank the civilian provincial leaders on the subordinate 
provincial defense mobilization commissions.  
Even the anti-corruption campaign by Xi Jinping has left the much of the PLA 
unscathed (especially at the middle and lower levels of the military), because while the 
organization in charge of the campaign, the Party’s Central Discipline Investigation 
Commission (CDIC), has “sent teams to almost all Party and [S]tate agencies in the name 
of supervision…no team has been sent to the military; instead, supervision is performed 
[by the military] internally.”86 The influence and penetration of both the military and 
civilian side of China’s civil-military relations, rather than just penetration of the military 
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by the civilian, has caused China expert Andrew Scobell to call it “interpenetration.”87 
An apt term given the enhanced ability of the military to influence the civilian side of 
government through measures, at least designed, to control and influence the military by 
the civilian side. 
Even if civilian leaders on provincial, municipal or county level organizations 
manage to resist any influence the structure of these organizations places on them, they 
are still personally lack much of the knowledge and credentials to push back too strongly 
on military proposals. Such civilians in full time jobs don’t have a lot of time for formal 
military education or experience. While they are supposed to “at least spend two days a 
year studying military knowledge, participating in military activities, and receiving 
education on national defense in the format of  “military days”[,]” this paltry amount of 
time and effort spent trying to familiarize themselves with military affairs will not give 
them the foundation to actually challenge military officers they interact with on what they 
think the military should do. At best, it will allow them to have some vague idea of what 
they sign off on when they approve what the military asks them to so long as it is not too 
extreme. The fact the PLA withholds much of the information about itself, especially its 
capabilities and operations, from even government officials with security clearance, 
further weakens civilian oversight. Given that this secrecy also extends to internal 
communication about operations or crises, such as the EP-3 Incident in 2001, this means 
that things “may not always be reported in depth or accurately to civilian leaders.”88 
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Oddly enough, some of the measures, such as frequent transfers of military 
officers, designed to reduce the possibility of military leaders unduly influencing civilian 
leaders, forming too close of relationships with local civilian leaders, or creating a 
powerbase for themselves separate from the central government, might have actually 
made it more difficult for military officers to form even respectful relationships with 
civilian counterparts.89 Those sort of personal relationships used to be one of the most 
important ways civilian leaders influenced military leaders and earned their respect. Their 
disintegration likely has hurt the ability of civilian leaders to work with and influence 
military leaders more than the ability of military leaders to work with and influence 
civilian leaders for the reasons discussed in this section. Though the CCP remains 
powerful, its power over the PLA has been a diminishing trend for years as its avenues of 
influence are supplanted by State organizations, its political ‘agents’ within the PLA 
become more professional and prioritize military requirements over political ones, and 
civilian members (both CCP and State) with military responsibilities becoming 
increasingly incapable of effectively interacting as equals with their military counterparts 
and pushing back on military ideas.   
PLA Interests Completely Aligned with Those of the CCP?: 
 In many ways the PLA is beginning to resemble Western professionalized 
militaries though the PLA still officially remains the army of the CCP before that of the 
PRC. Yet this could change. During the 1990s outside observers began to remark that the 
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PLA was “not a Party stooge, because the professionalism of its officers has impelled 
them to question, and even resist, Party policies which they considered to be 
incompatible with their views.”90  
The PLA has developed distinct interests with the distinct attitudes and 
perspectives that come with them (although it still shares some interests with the CCP 
and State).91 A gap between some of the interests, attitudes, and perspectives appears to 
have emerged and are crystalizing.92 A particularly important gap concerns the use of 
force and the role of politics in the military that is often a gap between many civilian 
governments and militaries around the world.93 Due to the PRC’s history and the special 
relationship between the CCP and PLA, there are some factors that are unique to China’s 
civil-military relationships than to those, such as the US, where a political party did not 
found the country through a civil war and continue to maintain control in a one party 
system through a monopoly of force. Because of the implicit deal between the CCP and 
the PLA, the CCP must maintain the favor of the PLA or else the next time there is a 
Tiananmen Square the military might stand aside and let the civilian leadership be 
overthrown or actually assist in its overthrow as the militaries in several former Soviet 
states in Eastern Europe did. 
While the political nature of the PLA still differentiates it from other professional 
militaries, its increased separation from the CCP in personnel, roles, and capabilities have 
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resulted in a proud PLA with an increased capability and desire to resist excessive 
political interference from civilians while pursuing its interests.94 Other interests of the 
PLA include continued high-level military spending, continuation modernization of its 
forces, enhanced access and control of civilian technologies, resources (including 
human), and infrastructure for the PLA, and a stronger stand and progress on territorial 
and maritime issues.95 While the interests and views of the PLA are not necessarily 
completely different from those of the CCP, they are often very different when it comes 
to degree and what each thinks are acceptable means to achieve, even shared goals.96  
Weight of Their Unique Perspective: 
On sensitive issues such as China’s sovereignty (Taiwan or SCS for example) the 
PLA, especially by the mid- to late 1990s, had become the “hypernationalistic guardian” 
and voice within the Chinese government.97 While their civilian counterparts saw a more 
benign world (‘what could go right’), the PLA just focused on the threats to China (‘what 
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could go wrong’).98 By the time of the 1995-6 TSC, the top PLA leaders had risen up 
through the ranks and inculcated the lessons and perspectives of China’s PME.99 The 
PLA’s “professional monopoly on information and knowledge about military affairs” has 
meant that effectively within China only the PLA has been “competent to take 
responsibility for the military aspects of national security.”100 The Soviet military was 
similar, which allowed it to transform from subordinate party army to a “coalitional 
partner bureaucratic actor with the ability to bargain with top party leaders over issues 
that could affect its institutional interests and priorities.”101 The PLA has followed a 
similar path. While some have argued that any real autonomy of the PLA outside of 
extremely narrow issues could not happen and would constitute an impossible threat to 
CCP power, the Soviet example again shows that an evolving party-army can gain 
significant power all while not necessarily “challeng[ing] the sovereign role of the 
party.”102  
Unfortunately, while the top PLA leaders had benefitted from the learning 
institutions and military tools created by their predecessors, they did not inherit their 
experience.103 Of the top Chinese PLA leaders, only Chi Haotian had any personal 
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battlefield experience by the time of the 1995-6 TSC.104 This lack of personal battlefield 
experience among the top leadership might well have made the PLA more aggressive and 
less mindful of the negative consequences of creating an international crisis with the 
potential for war with the world’s most powerful military given what we know about the 
effects of a lack of battlefield experience on the decision-making of leaders.105  
Conclusion: 
In conclusion, due to the bifurcation of elites and the professionalization of the 
PLA, the PLA has been developing distinct interests and a distinct corporate identity 
from the CCP. Sometimes these interests remain compatible with those of the CCP, but 
sometimes they are not. Splits within the elite that occurred when integrated leadership 
was the norm, such as during the Korean War, are handled differently now that the PLA 
has gone from the armed wing of the Party to a professionalizing force with unique 
training, experience, and capabilities from the civilian side of government.  
The distinctions between the civilian and military sides of the government are not 
yet great enough for a true “grand divorce between the Party and the military in the form 
of a depoliticized and state-run military.”106 However, as we shall see in the chapter on 
the 1995-6 TSC, when there is a split in government between the civilian elites, the PLA 
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has the capability to become the kingmaker on certain policy issues.107 Whichever 
civilian ‘faction’ caters more towards the interests of the PLA will be more likely to win 
the policy debate.108 As the SCS chapter will also demonstrate, the PLA has taken its 
ability to make alliances with civilian factions or sections of government and applied it to 
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The Korean War: PLA as a Subordinate Actor Even in War 
Introduction: 
 The Korean War is vitally important to understand the evolution of the PLA and 
subsequently the role of the PLA in Chinese foreign policy and behavior abroad today. It 
was the first war fought abroad by the PLA and the first war fought by the PLA for the 
newly formed People’s Republic of China (PRC). The war would lead to the first 
evolutionary step of the PLA away from a revolutionary party-army based on peasant 
troops to its goal as a professional military with highly educated and trained troops. 
Through fighting non-communist troops, the PLA was able to see the benefits of a more 
autonomous, professional, modernized military. Through the intervention of political 
leaders and the strength of political goals over tactically smart goals, the PLA would get 
to also witness the downside of strong political rather than professional control of a 
military. 
 The intricate machinations of Mao in almost single-handedly getting the PRC into 
a war with the UN with bad allies like Stalin and Kim and Mao’s interference in military 
decisions to the detriment of the troops are two key factors in the trajectory of civil-
military relations in China. Special attention is paid to the limited number of individuals 
involved in the deal for the PLA to support the KPA in its war, the opposition to Chinese 
involvement once its possibility became known to more in the government, the military, 
and the general public, the repeated attempts by leaders (both military and civilians) to 
render moot the need for Chinese intervention, reluctance by military leaders to lead the 
Chinese intervention, the resistance by troops to barge into the middle of a war in such as 
poorly organized fashion, and finally the mostly failed resistance by the military to 
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political leaders and goals based on political criteria overriding military leaders and goals 
based on military criteria, which became more noticeable generally with each successive 
campaign. Though this material can be dense, it is important in understanding the 
subordinate role of the PLA in China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad during the 
Korean War and the developmental path the PLA took following the war.    
Push for War:  
Given the dependent nature of the DPRK and the PRC on the USSR, Kim and 
Mao would need to get Stalin’s permission and subsequent support (diplomatic, military, 
etc.) before officially launching their hoped for either conventional invasion of the ROK 
or invasion of the ROC on Taiwan, respectively. As Mao had never been to Moscow until 
he was finally invited there for the negotiations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, 
Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1949 (and Stalin’s birthday), it is thought that this was 
the first time Stalin and Mao had a true talk about allowing Kim to launch a conventional 
invasion to unite Korea under communist rule. Mao had several formal meetings as well 
as several private meetings with Stalin. Based on the fact that one of the topics discussed 
on their December 24, 1949 meeting was Asian communist parties, it is logical to believe 
that this may have been the first time the topic of the conventional invasion led by Kim 
was seriously raised.109 During Mao’s meetings with Stalin, Mao’s translator, Shi Zhe, 
told Dr. David Tsui (also known as Zerong Xu) in an interview that Stalin did talk with 
Mao about Kim’s idea which disproves the previous notion that he did not at this early 
date.110 Khrushchev, who was in some of the Stalin-Mao meetings, also recalls that when 
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asked by Stalin about what he thought about Kim uniting Korea by force, Mao not only 
approved of the idea but also stated that the United States would not get involved in a 
civil war in Korea.111 According to a Chinese source, Mao pushed his support for Kim’s 
idea even further by telling Stalin that they should help ‘Little Kim’ (Xiao Kim).112 
Records from Soviet archives now also confirm the discussion as well.113 Despite Mao’s 
apparent assurance, at least with Stalin, that the United States would not intervene 
following Kim’s conventional invasion, Stalin and Mao still discussed countermeasures 
to respond which would use the PLA and a PLA bolstered KPA with limited Soviet 
support to avoid a direct war between the US and the USSR.114  
 In the build up to the conventional invasion of the ROK, both the USSR and the 
PRC contributed massive amounts of resources and personnel to the preparation. But it is 
perhaps the contribution ordered by Mao that was the most crucial for the future 1950 
conventional invasion of the ROK. While the KPA had been able to obtain transferred 
Soviet weapons and weapons captured from the Japanese 34th and 58th armies, Nie 
Rongzhen, chief of staff of the PLA General Staff Department, states that the KPA still 
lacked enough men to use those weapons. Therefore, Mao ordered him on January 22, 
1950 to send the 156th Division (an ethnic Korean division originally of 15,500 men) to 
serve in the KPA.115 This division was combined with other ethnically ‘Korean Chinese’ 
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units to form the 15th Independent Division.116 It is important to note that a majority of 
the ‘Korean Chinese’ that Mao ordered transferred to the KPA were in fact Chinese 
citizens who were ethnically Korean, but in many cases, had never been to Korea before 
their transfer. This division was in addition to the 24,500 members of the 164th and 166th 
Divisions that Mao had transferred to the KPA in 1949.117 This means that between early 
1949 and the end of March 1950, almost three months before the conventional invasion 
by the DPRK, that at least 63,000 ethnically Korean but still Chinese citizens formerly of 
the PLA had been transferred to the KPA.118 Many of these departing troops were also 
equipped at the expense of the PRC rather than the DPRK before they left the PRC.119 So 
from when Kim Il-sung and other veterans of the anti-Japanese Amalgamated Army of 
Northeast China had returned to Korea in 1945, up until five days before the conventional 
communist invasion began on June 25th, 1950, the Chinese Communists had contributed 
approximately 69,200 troops to the Korean communist cause.120 This means that almost 
half of the conventional invading military force was made up of Chinese troops (by 																																																								
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citizenship) or Chinese-trained troops.121 The Chinese ‘intervention’ in the Korean War 
could then be said to have been more significant and to have begun at least several 
months earlier than it has previously been thought of as (October 1950) as well as that 
Mao started the ‘intervention’ well before the rest of the Chinese leadership debated and 
agreed to it.  
 The transfer of whole divisions of troops to serve in the army of a foreign country 
during an unfinished civil war would have been a controversial decision, not that it was 
made with much input on the Chinese side other than Mao’s own.122 Many of the ethnic 
Korean, but majority Chinese citizen, PLA troops came from the PLA Fourth Field Army 
under Commander Lin Biao. Some members of the government who knew of Mao’s 
multiple transfer decisions did agree with them, such as Lin Biao. Unfortunately, even 
those that knew of and agreed with Mao’s transfer decisions did not know of all of the 
transfer decisions he made. Despite the order to transfer at least 16,000 of his own troops 
out from under his command, it seems Lin Biao did not know of this transfer decision 
(part of a deal between Mao and Kim) until at least nine months after it had been made.123 
It seems even quite a few of the troops, including officers, did not agree or at least later 
came to disagree with their transfer to the KPA. These troops asked to join the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers (CPV) when it entered Korea in October 1950 but were denied.124 
Waves of these troops would return to China after the war either seeking to return home 
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or fleeing the purges in Korea that followed the armistice of the war.125 Such poor 
treatment by the integrated leadership (especially Mao) and government they were given 
to likely stayed with these troops. The pledge to use the PLA to assist the DPRK in its 
conquest of the ROK and transfers to the DPRK with little to no input from the Chinese 
military itself are examples of the subordinate role of the PLA even when it came to such 
basic issues as control of their own people and equipment, let alone what its future 
missions would be. 
  Despite Stalin’s position as leader of the Soviet Union, after his initial approval 
of the Korean War, he allowed Mao and Kim to both decide if the war would actually 
occur and bear the burden if it failed. This is shown in one instance when Stalin, saying 
goodbye to Kim after his 1950 trip to Moscow, said “[i]f you should get kicked in the 
teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help.”126 Despite having 
told Stalin that he agreed with Kim’s goal of armed unification and that they should aid 
Kim, Mao likely did not want to actually have to aid Kim more than he already had as it 
could make his own ‘unification’ more difficult. The Chinese Politburo (PB) was even 
more against Kim’s idea but the effective decisions had already been made by the 
principals (Stalin, Mao and Kim) and that was what truly mattered for the war.127   
Mao Struggles to ‘Convince’ the Rest of the Chinese Leadership: 
Despite the large number of signs that the DPRK had been preparing to launch its 
conventional invasion soon, the Chinese top leadership was quite divided over how to 
respond to the conventional invasion when it did happen and later how to respond to the 																																																								
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entrance of the UN force (United Nations Command or UNC) in the war. The large 
number of frantic gatherings held by top Chinese leaders even before the UNC turned the 
tied of the war with the September 15th Inchon landing is evidence of the deep division 
within the Chinese leadership.128 Despite the fact that Mao had already pledged to 
intervene with force to save the DPRK and had already given significant assistance to the 
DPRK’s war efforts so far, these facts have not been found to have been brought up 
during the discussions over whether China would intervene militarily in the documents 
and personal accounts to have been released so far. This lack of even the mention of the 
deals Mao and Stalin made in the USSR indicate that Mao nearly alone on the Chinese 
side seems to have known and agreed to the true reason why the PRC would prevent the 
complete destruction of the DPRK regardless of likelihood of success or threat to the 
PRC.  
Going back to Mao’s meetings with Stalin in 1949 and 1950, Stalin had made 
clear to Mao through his actions and ‘suggestions’ that if Mao wanted a modern PLA, 
permission for and further assistance to invade Taiwan, and significant economic 
assistance for China’s development, he would need to agree to assist Kim in his war. 
Even though the possibility of a quick invasion of Taiwan had been denied to him with 
the deployment of the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait after the June 25th 
conventional invasion, Mao was still bound by his agreement with Stalin if he wanted all 
that he had been promised and to avoid appearing to be another Tito.129 
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 Although the top leader of the PRC, Mao does not seem to have been able to 
outright drag the nascent country further into another war. Mao had to ‘convince’ more of 
the top leadership to go along with him. The arguments that emerged from the top 
leadership against Mao’s push for intervention followed two main lines of thinking.130 
The first was a sheer reluctance to essentially start a full-fledged war with the strongest 
military on earth on the less than ideal battlefield of Korea.131 The second was that it was 
not wise to fight a war, not only against the strongest military on earth, but while the PRC 
was only a year old and the people still needed to recover after decades of war.132 Lin 
Biao was undoubtedly the most vocal opponent of Mao’s push for intervention. Given 
that Lin Biao was considered one of the top military commanders in China and many of 
his troops had been transferred to the KPA, his vocal opposition was not an insignificant 
obstacle for Mao to overcome. Even later when asked to lead the CPV, according to Nie 
Rongzhen “Lin was so fearful of this task that he gave the excuse of illness and 
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obstinately refused to go to Korea”.133 Lin Biao would later even attempt to get Zhou 
Enlai to co-sign a telegram opposing a full-fledged war with the US in Korea to which 
Zhou declined.134  
 Despite the rash of gatherings of the top leadership from late June until mid-
September, Mao had only been able to get some of the core top leaders to agree with his 
push for further intervention and at times they would still have second thoughts. As the 
tide of war began to turn against the DPRK, leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi 
were suggesting exit strategies for the KPA that would have rendered moot the need for 
Chinese intervention.135 As the Chinese leadership gradually had to include more people 
from government in the debate and preparation for a Korean intervention, Mao ran up 
against more stringent opposition to said intervention.136 Nie Rongzhen recalled how 
some party members whom had originally objected to getting into war with the strongest 
military on earth, only “stabilized after our timely education and various forms of 
persuasion.”137 Following the June 25th conventional invasion and the entrance of the 
UNC into the war, the possibility of war with the US then became known to the Chinese 
general public. The fear generated by that possibility required a similar ‘educating’ 
campaign to calm them down and bolster their confidence in the armed forces of China, 
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which had to be continued even after the CPV attacked the UNC, though it was not as 
effective as the Chinese leadership perhaps hoped.138  
 As troops arrived in northeast China in bulk in July 1950, they began to raise their 
concerns as they started to receive orders. At a meeting of commanders (of division level 
and above) in Shenyang, some of the commanders expressed their serious concerns that 
the force would be outmatched by the better equipped US military who would have both 
naval and air superiority as well as nuclear bombs.139 There does seem to have been a 
momentum shift of opinion in the military around this time though, as those who would 
be involved in the actual war realized that they were going to fight no matter what they 
said or did. The Chinese war machine was already in motion and no one wanted to get 
run over by it. As Shu Guang Zhang wrote, the Chinese military was now like “an arrow 
on a drawn bowstring, nothing could prevent its release.”140 The force had been given an 
early September deadline to be ready to intervene, and therefore their political 
indoctrination would have prepared them to accept an earlier intervention than the 
government in Beijing who had not received the same vigorous indoctrination.141 Despite 
the indoctrination, the realities of the coming war were hard to paper over. The 
momentum shift of opinion in the civilian government seems to have occurred closer to 
the intervention as evidenced by the continuing reticence in the lower levels of leadership 
																																																								
138 Frank Dikotter, The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution 1945-
1957, Bloomsbury Press, 2013, p.136-142. 
139 Ibid, p.62-63. 
140 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953, University of Kansas Press, 1995, p.85. 
141 Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu (tran. and ed.), Mao’s Generals Remember 
Korea, University of Kansas Press, 2001, p.62-71. 
	 64	
(mostly below Politburo Standing Committee or PBSC and Central Military Commission 
or CMC). 
Politics began interfering with Chinese military operations even before the large-
scale Chinese intervention in October 1950. Likely due to a lack of trust between Stalin 
and Mao, the Soviets would not be sending them enough weapons to rearm their force or 
air cover for the initial stage of the intervention.142 While Mao was not deterred by the 
prospect of the PLA, under the moniker of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) as of 
early October, attacking the UNC, some of the CPV commanders were. In fact, they were 
so concerned that Mao had to get CPV leader Peng Dehuai to issue a reassurance to CPV 
commanders to quell their concerns.143 
Again on the eve of the Chinese intervention, the CPV commanders appealed to 
the political leadership, namely Mao, to delay the intervention for three months, so they 
could switch out their captured Japanese, Nationalist, and old Soviet weapons for newer 
all Soviet weapons. Mao would deny this appeal and the concerns of the CPV 
commanders again.144 The officers who were to prepare the troops to intervene in Korea 
reported further signs of reservation towards the poorly prepared intervention. The 
political commissar Du Ping stated that of the members of the Thirteenth Army, only 
50% were “actively supporting” the planned intervention while 40% were “passively” 
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okay with it, and 10% opposed the planned intervention as of mid-August.145 The 
feelings of the Thirteenth Army seem to have been shared in similar proportions in the 
other armies in the northeast but that did not matter enough to Mao.  
It seems though that the commanders were more likely to be passive or opposed 
to the intervention, especially as it was being handled, than their troops. Following First 
Campaign, the CPV Political Department at a meeting came to the conclusion that the 
commanders, who had not received the same level of political indoctrination as their 
troops, were more ‘conservative’ in battle.146 This reality is evidence of a gap in views 
between commanders who had more experience, knowledge, and training for war than 
their peasant troops who had been inspired by significant propaganda. The gap is a 
similar gap that exists between leaders with military experience and leaders without 
military experience on their decision-making concerning the use of force.147  
While Mao, as well as the other civilian leaders of China, did often have some 
military experience, their primary military experience was most often as political 
commissars years before, not in true or current military positions. The gap in perception 
of the situation and opinions on military operations between the individuals whose main 
job was the military and those whose it was not would be more apparent as the “gap 
between political goals and tactical reality… became wider at the end of each 
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campaign.”148 This growing gap was evidence of the fact that even in an integrated 
leadership, there are still differences in levels of experience and views, and when put 
under pressure these differences came to the surface. 
Unsurprisingly, Mao had difficultly in convincing a member of the military to 
lead the unpopular intervention. His first pick, Lin Biao, refused the position as did his 
second pick Su Yu, although they both refused officially on account of illness, it is 
thought that of the two perhaps only Su Yu legitimately refused due to that reason rather 
than reluctance to lead the intervention (although they both still held military positions 
during their illnesses anyways which indicates reluctance to lead was a strong factor in 
turning down the job).149 Mao’s third choice for commander of the CPV, Peng Dehuai, 
only accepted the position after initially being against it, spending a sleepless night 
thinking on it and having a meeting with Mao before he formally supported the 
intervention at a meeting later that day.150 It was not just the troops or their potential 
leaders who had deep reservations about China being slowly drawn to the Korean War. 
The staff of Zhou Enlai even asked him to reverse the demobilization underway of over a 
million PLA troops. Zhou, however, even after the DPRK launched its conventional 
invasion in late June refused to reverse the current mobilization.151 Even at the last-
minute meetings in early October, according the PLA chief of staff, Nie Rongzhen, both 																																																								
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top civilian and military leaders were of the “majority opinion” that “unless absolutely 
necessary, the war should not be fought”.152  
Political Interference During the War: ‘It Only Gets Harder From Here’: 
Due to the focus of this chapter on the subordinate role of the PLA even during 
the Korean War, the material and human capabilities of the PLA/CPV will not be 
discussed. While they are linked to their ability to act as a pressure group later in their 
history, given the lack of effective difference in technology and materials between the 
Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, they were not the reason for subordinate role of 
the PLA/CPV during this time. The political and military leaders still effectively shared 
the same experience with waging war. Only the introduction of the PLA Air Force 
(PLAAF) was a new weapon in the arsenal of the PLA, and given the limited capabilities 
of the PLAAF and the relatively limited understanding of air power among the 
leadership, the PLAAF would play a “negligible role in war operations.”153 What follows 
is an edited outline of the war when political interference emerged.  
It appears during the Second Campaign (November 25 – December 24, 1950) that 
Mao’s “military romanticism,” as Shu Guang Zhang referred to it, began to really set in 
for the Korean War as the goals Mao wanted the CPV to achieve were increasingly 
beyond their capabilities.154 Despite their early successes, the CPV was reaching its 
limits, and by the end of the Second Campaign the weaknesses of the non-professional, 
peasant army operating abroad for the first time were greatly hampering the force. The 
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lack of sufficient capabilities was harming the ability of the CPV to perform its 
increasingly ambitious assigned tasks. These limited capabilities led Peng to question 
Mao’s desire for a quick start to the next campaign with the CPV facing such problems. 
Peng’s legitimate concerns, however, were disregarded by Mao.155  
 Peng was not alone in knowing that the troops badly needed rest after the two 
campaigns. The CPV supply lines had doubled in length while under the constant 
harassment of the superior UNC air force.156 Even Du Ping, director of the CPV Political 
Department, stated that all of the leading commanders at the CPV HQ agreed with Peng 
that the CPV needed rest and to not launch a new offensive.157 
  However, it was not the military leadership who was calling a majority of the 
shots now. As early as December 13th, 1950, while the Second Campaign was still 
ongoing, Mao disregarded the request(s) to wait until spring so the CPV could recover. 
Instead, Mao told him he wanted the Third Campaign (December 31, 1950 – January 8, 
1951) to begin in early January.158 But it was not just the commanders in Korea who were 
attempting to convince Mao to abandon his rushed timetable, as military leaders in 
Beijing, such as Nie Rongzhen, were as well.159 During this time, it is recalled that Mao 
revealed to those in Beijing that the rush was needed to coordinate the field struggle with 
the “political struggle” at the UN.160 The prioritization of political goals was coming to 
																																																								
155 Xiaoming Zhang, Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War 
in Korea, Texas A&M University Press, 2003, p.97. 
156 Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu (tran. and ed.), Mao’s Generals Remember 
Korea, University of Kansas Press, 2001, p.17. 
157 Ibid, p.92. 
158 Ibid, p.17-18. 
159 Ibid, p.45. 
160 Ibid, p.45. 
	 69	
the forefront and was to the detriment of the CPV in Korea. Peng would later complain 
that the difficult Third Campaign had been fought for “political considerations” only.161 
Mao was not the only communist political leader pushing for a more aggressive 
campaign in the communist force, the Soviet Ambassador Terentii Shtykov and Kim Il-
sung were both pressing the CPV to more aggressively pursue the retreating UNC.162 
Kim Il-sung was so frustrated with Peng that he went to visit him in person to reprimand 
him and get him to start the next campaign without delay.163 Peng resisted the pressures 
at first, and recalled that the “strength of our forces had been reduced by nearly 50 
percent due to combat and non-combat losses”.164 Despite the poor condition of the CPV 
and despite Stalin actually stepping in and withdrawing Ambassador Shtykov, Kim was 
able to bargain Peng down from three to four months of rest to only two months for rest 
for the CPV.165 
The following quote perhaps best summarizes the difference between civil-
military relations in a country with a professional military and a country with a non-
professional army under integrated leadership: 
“The decision-making process for the Third Campaign thus reveals a unique 
bargaining process between Mao and his field commanders. From that point until 
the end of the Fifth Campaign, political goals clearly defined by Mao tended to go 
beyond CPVF [CPV] capability. Rarely could field commanders ignore or refuse 																																																								
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these often unattainable goals. They nevertheless always argued for tactical 
flexibility so the goals could be pursued with some range of realism or with lower 
expectations. The final outcome of this bargaining, explicit or implicit, tended to 
be a compromise between political desirability and tactical feasibility.”166  
However, because Mao was “bargaining” from a more powerful position than those 
underneath him, he always got more of what he wanted. While these end results were not 
always exactly what he wanted, they were almost always beyond the capabilities of the 
CPV. It was they who paid the price of such compromises with their lives by the 
thousands every time. 
Even Du Ping, as director of the CPV Political Department, realized their early 
successes (both real and imagined) were actually creating a dangerous problem for them: 
overconfidence. Their political indoctrination primarily of the troops, rather than their 
commanders, combined with their territorial advances resulted in the “tendency to 
underestimate the enemy, a growing belief in a quick victory, and disagreements over 
certain strategic policies.”167 This overconfidence helped the troops and certain political 
leaders to push for more aggressive military operations without much heed to the advice 
of the seasoned field commanders and senior military leaders (such as Peng Dehuai) 
operating in Korea. This phenomenon became more prominent with successive 
campaigns. The CPV was becoming victims of its own success and its reach was quickly 
exceeding its grasp. 
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The increased disconnect between words and reality led Peng Dehuai to tell Du 
Ping to “[t]ry not to use exaggerated words.”168 While regular poor reports are likely to 
blame for some of the inaccuracies in the view of the situation by higher-level leaders, as 
well as the unrealistic expectations of Mao, most of these likely are a result of pandering 
either for promotion or to avoid punishment. The likely intentional misstatement of 
failure and success, most notably with causalities, would have been a byproduct of an 
unprofessional military where personal favor with political leaders rather than more 
objective military qualifications were critical for promotion, and where regulation of 
these were neither regularized nor objective.  
 The Fourth Campaign (January 25 – April 21, 1951) very much followed the 
political leadership’s direction with their own political objectives superseding the military 
leadership and their more military-centered objectives. Mao’s cable to Peng calling for 
the Fourth Campaign encapsulates this phenomenon. Rather than asking what the CPV 
could do or stating broad goals that the military leaders on the ground with real 
knowledge of the battlefield situation could realistically act upon, Mao began to routinely 
named very specific positions (for example the Taejon-Andong line) and very specific 
casualty goals overall (wipe out 20,000-30,000 troops) which he then broke down by 
nationality (“part of the American forces and four or five South Korean divisions”) that 
he wanted the CPV to achieve.169 He actually ordered this very specific and unrealistic 
example offensive while acknowledging that the CPV had not been re-supplied which 
severely hampered its ability to operate at all. 
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 During the Fourth Campaign, Mao recalled Peng to Beijing to get an in-person 
report. Despite Peng telling Mao that the Korean War “could not be won quickly,” Mao 
still said “[w]in a quick victory if you can; if you can’t, win a slow one.”170 With 
successive campaigns, Mao’s orders and ‘suggestions’ became more unrealistic putting 
more pressure on the CPV, particularly Peng, to try to hit the evermore-illusive targets he 
set. Even in later exchanges after the Fifth Campaign with Soviet leaders, Mao was 
informed that he was trying to get the CPV to undertake risky plans that relied on 
resources that the CPV, even when combined with the KPA, did not possess.171 Despite 
their overwhelming numerical advantage (1.3 million against 340,000 troops), the joint 
CPV-KPA offensive failed completely and cost them 53,000 casualties.172 
 The Fifth Campaign (April 22 – June 10, 1951) was a disaster for the CPV and 
perhaps the clearest example of the negative consequences of Chinese political leaders 
intervening in military operations. Political leaders in any country intervening or 
becoming too intimately involved with military matters, especially on a tactical scale, is 
always risky.173 Mao did have military experience as a solider during the 1911 
Revolution (though he did not do any fighting), as a political commissar in CCP armed 
units, and spoke several times at the early PLA schools. These experiences gave him 																																																								
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some knowledge base and reputation from which to voice his opinions. However, Mao 
was not as great of a military mastermind as he thought he was. Mao repeatedly ignored 
military advice from a number of peers (foreign and domestic), such as Stalin on the use 
of artillery. Mao’s certainty in his own opinions delayed CCP military victory in the 
Chinese Civil War for at least a decade according to Stalin.174 As has been shown, Mao 
also repeatedly ignored the pleas of Chinese military leaders before and through the 
Chinese intervention in Korea. Untold scores of Chinese soldiers died needlessly because 
Mao kept insisting on less rest for troops, ignoring the deplorable state of China’s 
logistics system and air force, and placing political goals above sound military goals. 
However, as it has been shown in this chapter, it would take several campaigns into the 
Korean War for the detrimental effects of Chinese political leaders interfering in military 
affairs to become undeniably apparent. 
 Mao wanted to fight the Fifth Campaign like the First Campaign and the Chinese 
Civil War before. He consistently underestimated the UNC and overestimated the power 
of the ‘human factor’ in battle over technology.175 Other Chinese leaders did this as well, 
but none of them were pushing as hard for unrealistic goals as he was. It wasn’t until 
China requested and received Soviet military advisors to assist with CPV decision-
making and operations in the fall of 1951 after the Fifth Campaign that they were finally 
able to adapt their style of fighting to the UNC’s adapted style.176 
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 The CPV, and particularly Peng as its head, was under great pressure from Mao to 
have a breakthrough as the negative situation was creating pressure from within the 
communist camp to accept successive UN offers for negotiations. In the end, the lack of 
major success indeed led to the acceptance to negotiate though the fighting would still 
continue.177 However, by the time the Fifth Campaign came to an end, much damage had 
already been done. The Fifth Campaign was so disastrous, especially in relation to the 
previous campaigns, with 80% of all CPV POWs during the war being captured as a 
result of the Fifth Campaign.178 Out of the 1.3 million communist troops in Korea over 
700,000 (100,000 KPA and 600,000 CPV) troops participated in the Fifth Campaign. 
Despite this much larger force, the combined CPV-KPA force was actually driven back 
to positions north of the 38th parallel.179 In addition to the recapturing of ROK territory, 
the UNC only suffered 39,274 casualties, while the CPV-KPA suffered about 105,000 
casualties.180  
 The remainder of the war following the completion of the Fifth Campaign is best 
characterized by the China’s decision to keep “fighting while negotiating”.181 The new 
offensives were based around trying to gain more leverage at the negotiating table. 
However, the negotiations were routinely off and on. While leaders in Beijing and 
Moscow may have been fine with the continued fighting, those in Korea (both Korean 
and Chinese) became increasingly less so. When Peng Dehuai suggested to Mao that they 																																																								
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should indicate that they were open to a ceasefire (a prelude to negotiations) in early 
1951, he was turned down.182 Even Kim Il-sung who had so fervently pushed for the 
conventional invasion, eventually wanted to stop the fighting devastating the DPRK. As 
early as January 1952 Kim had sent DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Heon-yeong to tell Peng 
that the “Korean people throughout the country demand peace and do not want to 
continue the war.” 183  
Mao and some of the other leaders in Beijing, however, had additional ulterior 
motives to keep the fighting going. Stalin had made it clear through his actions and 
‘suggestions’ that the USSR would only give the PLA the assistance it needed to develop 
and modernize when they were in Korea fighting the UNC. The Soviet Chief Military 
Advisor in Korea, Vladimir Nikolaevich Razuvaev, reported “the Chinese leaders 
worried that much of the Soviet military aid would decrease or cease all together once the 
war ended.” 184 So despite the pleas by CPV, KPA, and North Korean leaders for the 
fighting to stop, Mao kept sacrificing them in exchange for Soviet aid. In the end it would 
take the death of Stalin and the decision by the new Soviet leadership under Khrushchev 
to end the ‘negotiating while fighting.’  
Conclusion: 
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Evidence that the Korean War was an event predominantly organized by the 
principals (Stalin, Kim, and Mao) is further shown by the fact that knowledge of 
preparations were kept from non-essential members of the governments involved, even 
high level people in USSR didn’t know details.185 During the discussions over whether 
the invasion should be allowed and what roles each state should play, information of 
these on-goings were limited to the principals and a few key actors who needed to know 
in order to prepare the war machines. The frantic debates by the general Chinese 
leadership over whether or not to intervene in the Korean War show how the rest of 
China was of a different opinion to Mao and those peers who would at least eventually 
support him before the intervention took place.  
However, the fact that Mao was still able to lead a reluctant China to get (further) 
involved in the war, illustrates just how powerful revolutionary and personal clout were 
in the nascent PRC and how weak the institutional restraints were on leaders like Mao. 
The rest of the integrated leadership lacked both the will to stand united against the 
intervention and lacked the personal revolutionary clout to strongly push back against 
Mao’s warmongering. On the military side specifically, none of the PLA/CPV leaders 
could easily question Mao’s military credentials to override him in military affairs since 
he possessed similar military credentials to them. The non-professional nature of the 
Chinese armed forces combined with the integrated nature of China’s leadership 
prevented more autonomous and effective decision-making by the PLA (before the 
Chinese intervention) and the CPV (following the intervention). These aforementioned 
factors combined with the still limited capabilities of the Chinese armed forces helped 																																																								
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define China’s role in the Korean War and the subordinate role of the PLA to political 
considerations even in war. 
While the Chinese revolutionary preference for true ‘people’s warfare’, would not 
end until the conclusion of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, the devastation of the CPV 
(1/3 of all troops sent to Korea would become casualties), KPA, and of the Korean 
landscape by the professional UNC showed the PLA that revolutionary fervor was not 
sufficient to completely overcome military professionalism made possible through 
technical mastery and professional autonomy.186 While these facts were made very 
apparent through the Korean War and did take root, it would take more time and further 
conflicts fought by the US (such as the Gulf War) for these seeds to grow within the 
Chinese government (less time for in the PLA specifically though).187 The effects of these 
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1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis: PLA Operating as a Pressure 
Group in a Government with Civilian-Technocratic 
Leadership 
Introduction: 
 This chapter, unlike the chapter on the Korean War, will be able to examine the 
effects of the bifurcation of elites with the end of the integrated leadership alongside the 
rise of technocratic civilian leaders without true military credentials and the rise of career 
military men on the separating perspectives of the military and civilian sides of 
government. The early effects of the movement to professionalize the PLA will also be 
examined with the previously mentioned effects of bifurcation on the role of the PLA in 
China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad during the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis 
(TSC). The result of these phenomenon was the ability of the PLA to act as a pressure 
group within the Chinese government to push for their preferences rather than a 
subordinate role they held during the Korean War which greatly shaped their role in the 
conflict and inflicted great costs in blood and treasure. This new ability of the PLA 
undercuts the notion and frequent statement by the CCP that it has ‘absolute control’ over 
the military. Both the opposition led by the PLA and its success in changing the initial 
response by the government, showed that while the CCP had control of the PLA, it was 
not ‘absolute’ and was itself open to influence. 
It is important to keep in mind the shaky foundations of the first non-integrated 
leadership and the weak personal standing of the newly appointed leader of China, Jiang 
Zemin, to understand the environment the PLA was operating, now as an effective 
	 79	
pressure group, in. Therefore, these elements must be discussed before examination of 
the crisis can begin.  
Third Times a Charm?: 
Despite Deng Xiaoping not wanting to mimic Mao’s chaotic rule, he similarly 
destroyed his chosen and potential successors.188 Deng’s difficulty in choosing and 
staying with a successor would eventually lead him to pick the unlikely Jiang, then the 
head of the CCP in Shanghai, to succeed him. To understand Jiang’s apparent weakness 
and nature of his relationship with the other top leaders of China, which is crucial to 
understanding his actions surrounding the 1995-6 TSC, his rise from party leader in 
Shanghai to the top three positions in government (General Secretary of the CCP, 
Chairman of the CMC, and President of the PRC) must be examined in short first.  
Jiang Tries to Get His Bearings: 
The Chinese government tried to paint the leadership that eventually emerged 
from the 1989 protests as a result of an “orderly transfer of power”.189 However it was 
anything but, and the end result was still unstable due in part to the weakness of Deng’s 
newest anointed successor, Jiang. At first Jiang was only General Secretary of the CCP, 
while Yang Shangkun remained President of the PRC and Deng remained Chairman of 
the CMC.190 Unlike Deng’s two previous attempted successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
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Ziyang who were given the top positions in both the Party and State initially, Jiang only 
received the top Party position at first. Although Jiang would eventually receive the top 
State and Military positions, he was still very vulnerable when he first moved to Beijing, 
and had to heavily rely on Deng’s support.191  
When he first arrive, he repeatedly told civilian and military officials that he was 
not qualified or ready to hold the positions he was being appointed to by Deng.192 To 
avoid alienating the established powers within the government, he initially attempted to 
avoid commanding anyone in effect. It led the US Defense Intelligence Agency to state 
that “[i]t seems that Jiang is so “general” a Secretary that he appears to be in charge of 
nothing.”193 This tactic seems to have been a smart choice as Jiang started out in Beijing 
with no powerbase of his own, while powerful individuals with potential ambitions to 
supplant him remained in key positions. Key antagonists in the 1989 protests, Li Peng 
and the Yang brothers (Yang Shangkun and his half-brother General Yang Baibing), 
would prove to be key antagonists to Jiang in the years to come, and in the case of Li, 
during the 1995-6 TSC. There were also a wide variety of institutions, all involved in 
Chinese national security policymaking around the time of the 1995-6 TSC to varying 
degrees, which had their own institutional interests and viewpoints that they were trying 
to push forward. China’s foreign and national security policymaking arenas were 																																																								
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becoming increasingly crowded. 
Figure 3 General Chinese National Security Policy Arena (Michale D. Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military 
in National Security Policymaking, RAND, 1998, p.5.) 
To further complicate the situation, 1995, when the crisis began, “was a crucial 
year for Jiang to complete the power succession.”194 With Deng’s protection for him 
fading as Deng faded from politics and potential strong rivals still in the PB and the 
PBSC, had Jiang garnered the enmity of the PLA as well as the civilian conservatives led 
by Li Peng by opposing the tougher military measures they supported, it could have well 																																																								
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cost him some of his power and potentially his positions.195 If there is any doubt that this 
could have happened, one only need look to the dramatic falls of Hua Guofeng, Hu 
Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang.196 The falls of other important leaders such as Wang Ming, 
Gao Gang, Deng Xiaoping twice, Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai, and the Gang of 
Four as a result of internal power struggles should further put to rest any doubts that the 
CCP and later PRC did not suffer from such destructive power struggles.197  
This is No Longer Your Father’s PLA: 
In addition to the actions by leaders, including ousting rivals and those who 
disagreed with the crackdown, the amount of political work (indoctrination) was 
significantly increased following the June 3-4, 1989 crackdown to make sure the ultimate 
guaranteeor of continuing CCP control became more loyal than its unease had 
demonstrated.198 The initial resistance of the PLA to suppress the demonstrations showed 
an apparent gap in the loyalty of the armed forces that China’s political leaders evidently 
wanted to correct. However, despite their additional attention to ensure the loyalty of the 
armed forces following the bloody crackdown on the 1989 protests, civilian political 																																																								
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leaders had not fully realized the changes that had been occurring within the PLA.199  The 
demographics of the PLA were changing as were their emphasis on expertise over 
‘redness.’200 The same old political tools alone were therefore no longer sufficient to keep 
this changing PLA fully loyal to the CCP above the PRC. The near fatal rupture of the 
CCP/civilian leaders during the 1989 protests and the protests’ traumatic end combined 
with the fading of the integrated leadership from daily political affairs had been the 
turning point for the PLA. The whole debacle was seen as major blow to PLA morale and 
reputation.201 
The more self-aware PLA that began to emerge from 1989 knew it could no 
longer be what it was before. It had seen the true bloody costs of their uneven 
relationship with their civilian leaders every time they had gone to war or started a crisis 
since the PRC was founded.202 The PLA had even been used as a weapon for domestic 
intraparty struggles for much of its history as the bastion of authorized violence and 
ultimate control.203 The traumatic events of 1989, however, gave them the resolve they 																																																								
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needed to push for more substantive change, and the fading from power of the last of the 
integrated leadership with the rise of civilian technocrats gave them the opportunity to 
begin to change the civil-military relationship in China.  
The Role of the PLA: Korean War vs. 1995-6 TSC: 
The role of the PLA in the 1995-6 TSC was fundamentally different from its role 
in the Korean War, and was the first clear case where a change in the PLA’s role can be 
seen. The PLA’s interaction with the leadership began as being governed by personal 
revolutionary clout of leaders with ‘military’ experience where the PLA functioned as the 
‘attack dog.’ It then transformed to being governed by increasingly institutionalized 
mechanisms with a technocratic civilian leadership that sought their specialized skills and 
unique capabilities to performs tasks no one else in China could.204 During the 1990s in 
particular, the technological and human capabilities of the PLA had grown rapidly.205 
Unlike before, the PLA’s professional opinion had to be strongly taken into 
consideration. The PLA was truly becoming a distinct pillar in the government of the 
PRC. It should be noted, however, that the PLA was not yet fully professionalized. The 																																																								
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PLA had only been able to really start the process after Deng, as the last paramount 
leader from the integrated leadership, faded from politics in the early 1990s though some 
signs were visible after Mao died.206 As time went on under Jiang’s (and later Hu 
Jintao’s) rule, the PLA was under relatively weak civilian control and limited civilian 
oversight.207 Combined with the PLA’s desire to become a professional, modernized 
army with little to no political interference, the PLA would make greater strides towards 
its goal during the time of these two civilian leaders.208 The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
would be the first real event to see how the professionalizing and bifurcating changes had 
influenced the PLA’s role in China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad.  
Lee Rejects Jiang Who Takes It Pretty Well: 
Despite the fact that most of those involved in the previous two TSCs had retired, 
these party and military elders wanted to see more progress on capturing Taiwan before 
they died. Though progress on less politically sensitive issues, such as culture and trade, 
had been made during the first few years of Jiang’s leadership, these elders were not 
satisfied with the slow pace.209 Some of these elders even took it upon themselves to 
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write letters to Jiang urging him to speed up the acquisition of Taiwan (‘by hook or by 
crook’).210  
Jiang had shown the seriousness to which he took Taiwan and his desire to make 
it a pillar of his legacy when he brought his former mentor, Wang Daohan, out of the 
retirement he had been in for over five years to lead the organization China used as its 
representative to talk with Taiwan, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straits.211 Although a broad swath of government groups and interests were at least 
consulted on the new moderate push led by Jiang to engage Taiwan and bring it under 
Chinese control and although they was consented to it, the more moderate approach still 
had to win out over any concerns of a ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ approach from 
conservatives.212 Given that peaceful engagement with Taiwan had resulted in benefits 
for both China and Taiwan, particularly economic ones, without an apparent crisis or 
threat, those wary of the more moderated approach would have been hard pressed to 
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come up with a decent reason to oppose at least attempting the latest push of the more 
moderate approach.213  
While a broad range of individuals, ranging from Zhao Ziyang to Yang Shangkun, 
had previously sought to increase engagement with Taiwan, their efforts had mainly been 
out of the public eye.214 The new approach, or more accurately the latest and most liberal 
push of the ‘peaceful inducement approach’, would be very public and was announced in 
a very prominent speech by Jiang during the 1995 Spring Festival.215 The more moderate 
approach and its public nature opened up a great opportunity for a humiliating public 
rejection of Jiang by Taiwan. In the speech, Jiang’s concrete proposals included 
“protection for Taiwan investment, sanctioned Taiwan’s economic and cultural 
interaction with the world, and for the first time called for an equal bilateral consultation, 
including a summit dialogue.”216 His speech was also noted for the point that ‘Chinese 
should not fight Chinese’ which was seen as supporting the status quo; so long as Taiwan 
did not proclaim independence, China would not use violence to conquer Taiwan. 
Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui rejected Jiang’s Eight-Point proposal by issuing his 
own Six-Point counter-proposal on April 8, 1995.217 The rejection would rouse the rancor 
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of conservatives in the Chinese civilian leadership and the PLA, both active and 
retired.218 
Lee Goes to Cornell: 
Several months after issuing the Six-Point counter-proposal, Lee traveled to the 
US to make his now famous speech at Cornell University. Prior to his arrival, the Clinton 
administration, in an attempt to avoid risking further damage to Sino-US relations, tried 
to block President Lee’s visit, going so far as to have Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher assure Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in April 1995 that Lee would not be 
able to visit.219 However, shortly later when it became apparent that Congress would vote 
on effectively allowing Lee’s visit, Secretary Christopher even gave Qian an early 
warning to expect the move by Congress.220 In fact, the Clinton administration only later 
relented after it became politically untenable to continue blocking a visit by Lee to his 
alma mater Cornell University due to the unanimous vote in the House of Representatives 
and the near unanimous vote in the Senate to allow his visit.221  
However, this strong show of support by America’s elected legislature should not 
have scared the Chinese leadership about a sudden change in America’s support for 
Taiwan, as the same lobbying that allowed Lee’s visit could be used to press China’s 																																																																																																																																																																					
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preferences on America in the future. Even Jiang admitted that China “certainly haven’t 
done enough lobbying of the U.S. Congress”.222 Jiang’s reasonable understanding of why 
the Clinton administration had relented and allowed Lee to visit was further demonstrated 
by the fact that while he had Chinese representatives lodge complaints, no meetings were 
initially cancelled and China’s ambassador was not recalled.223 
In his speech at Cornell, Lee did not call for Taiwanese independence or war with 
China but for a ““win-win” strategy” with China.224 He stated he “believed that mutual 
respect will gradually lead to the peaceful reunification of China under a system of 
democracy, freedom and equitable distribution of wealth.”225 Despite the later militant 
response from China, based on an objective reading of Lee’s speech, he put forward an 
honest and accurate portrayal of Taiwan as one can expect from the president of a 
country to a foreign audience.226 His speech, if anything, was the personal campaign 
speech of a politician seeking positive media coverage of his time in office, not a speech 
by a leader seeking to declare his already de facto independent country officially 
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independent anytime soon.227 Given the respectable nature of the speech and China’s 
initial relatively ‘normal’ diplomatic and media reaction, it seems at least Jiang and those 
more moderate members of the Chinese leadership agreed that this event was not too big 
of a deal. 
Drama on Stage or Drama Backstage?: 
Some have argued that although there was internal discord in the Chinese 
leadership at the time, because they all wanted to acquire Taiwan (the same goal), the 
discord would not influence their decisions with regard to the crisis.228 However, this 
view ignores the fact that during other splits within the Chinese leadership over how to 
attain a shared goal and at what cost, that the split within the leadership very much did 
influence what path they chose for China. Examples of the impact of discord caused by 
disagreement over how to achieve a shared goal can be found with the Korean War and 
even during the revolutionary days of the CCP before and after Mao rose to become 
paramount leader.229 The view that the 1995-6 TSC was a well-engineered drama also 
ignores the influence that a further self-aware PLA, with little to no overlap in personnel, 
knowledge, and experience with the civilian leadership, would wield and how the 
																																																								
227 Jianhai Bi, China Politic and Taiwan Crisis: China’s Leadership Succession and the 
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010, same pages as 
footnotes 374-377. 
228 You Ji, “Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of the War Games,” 
Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Acoss the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-
1996 Crisis, Routledge, 1999, p.77. You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan 
Strait,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 15, 1997, p.288. 
229 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, 
Mao, and the Korean War, Stanford University Press, 1993, p.22 and p.61. 
	 91	
weakened stature of a divided civilian leadership run by technocrats would force said 
civilian leadership to interact with this PLA.230  
If there was no “gap” in perspective between the moderates and the conservatives 
in the Chinese leadership, particularly between most of the civilians and the PLA, then 
the relatively reasonable reaction by China under Jiang would have been the only 
response, and there would have been no crisis.231 Had the whole crisis been some 
“carefully scripted and well-acted drama” with everyone in consensus on everything as 
has been suggested by some, than there would not have been the amount of internal 
discord towards the initial low-key reaction.232 However, the crisis was not some 
brilliantly engineered drama, it was a dangerous act of coercive diplomacy that was the 
result of pressure by opposition within the government spearheaded and dominated by the 
PLA.233  
We Tried It Your Way, and You Failed…Now We’ll Try It Our Way: 
The PLA was the main block of vocal opposition within the government to what 
they saw as an inadequate response from moderates led by Jiang to Lee’s Cornell speech 
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and Taiwan’s move to hold direct presidential elections later.234 Since integrated 
leadership had effectively faded from China and the civilian side was now run by civilian 
technocrats with no military experience, the differences in perspective between the 
military and the civilian sides of government were able to be clearly seen as the 
leadership was forced to alter its position to accommodate a more conservative view 
point championed by the PLA.235  
The notion of the military having a unique perspective, a “military mind,” from 
the civilian government had been observed in militaries around the world but was just 
now able to be seen in China.236 There always existed a “military mind” in the PLA even 
though it was often heavily tinged by revolutionary politics and interfered with by 
integrated leadership, as was shown in the Korean War. The “military mind” of the PLA 
now had sufficiently developed to make the PLA a distinct, strong voice in Chinese 
decision-making on certain issues. Combined with the ending of integrated leadership 
and the weakness and political struggles of the non-integrated leadership, the PLA 
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commanded a new kind of influence as will be seen with the militant reaction.237 This 
new kind of influence would be more typical of an apolitical professional military but 
combined with a continuing lack of sufficient institutionalized civilian control typical of 
armies of communist states.238 The relatively reasonable initial reaction being suddenly 
overtaken by a militant reaction would be evidence of this new kind of influence pedaled 
by the PLA.239 
The initial diplomatic restrained reaction from China revealed the less militant 
thinking of Jiang and Qian. Some meetings were later canceled or just rescheduled but 
only until June or July.240 Quite a normal response from a country reacting to what it sees 
as an action by another country that it disagrees with. Third-party persons, usually 
foreign scholars and businessmen, even after Lee’s Cornell speech continued to carry 
messages from Beijing to Taipei in order to try to coordinate potential meetings to 
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salvage progress made between the two sides.241 It wasn't until mid-June that it began to 
look like things might get serious when China recalled its ambassador to the US, 
according to John W. Garver under pressure from the PLA.242 While the recalling of an 
ambassador is a serious matter, this action is still relatively normal for a strong 
diplomatic response and seemed to be relatively inline with the moderated diplomatic 
reaction that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Taiwan Affairs Office were 
advocating.243  
It was not until military exercises were suddenly announced on July 18th that it 
was clear to the outside world how aggressively Beijing was going to proceed.244 It was 
also notable that these military actives were even announced, as previous military 
activities in the strait had been conducted without formal proclamation.245 These military 
exercises would be the largest PLA operation since it invaded Vietnam in 1979.246 It 
should be noted that even before the visit by Lee to Cornell, the PLA had been 
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“advocating [for such] provocative displays of force” as a part of PLA strategy.247 The 
poor initial response by Jiang and other moderates was just the opportunity the PLA 
needed to harden China’s position towards Taiwan and these “provocative displays of 
force” were their chosen tools. 
Pressure Bearing Down on the Moderates: 
The initially low-key reaction followed by a militant overreaction is key for 
understanding the politics in Beijing over China’s response. Nothing changed from the 
US or Taiwan that would have seemingly necessitated an upgrading of response between 
the initial reaction and the announcement of military exercises and missile tests. Because 
of this lack of external stimuli, the reason for the change can logically be inferred to be 
the result of domestic factors. Because the more moderate civilian officials associated 
with Jiang, namely Wang Daohan and Qian, had been leading Jiang’s attempt to break 
the impasse between Beijing and Taipei, they became targets of more conservative 
officials for their apparent ‘failings.’ The result was that “moderate voices were 
overridden by the powerful military”.248 In all corners of government and government-
associated institutions, more moderate voices calling for a level-headed approach started 
to fall silent to avoid accusations of being unpatriotic.249 As a Chinese proverb says: 
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“Even when right, an intellectual always loses when talking with a soldier”.250  
Jiang and Qian had both been embarrassed when Lee was given a visa to the US 
despite the initial assurances they had received from top US officials that they had then 
conveyed to the rest of the leadership. According to an article in The New York Times, 
Qian was later paraphrased as to have said “I was assured a visa would not be 
issued…Imagine what I thought and what was thought of me when the visa was 
granted.”251 Because Jiang and Qian had been the chief high-level proponents of the 
moderate approach which apparently failed, “[t]heir policies toward the U.S. and Taiwan 
were under heavy criticism. Jiang was seen as too innocent, being unable to understand 
Lee thoroughly, or believing too easily the U.S.’s pledge that Lee would not be granted a 
visa to the United States.”252 Qian was even more strongly attacked by the PLA and was 
increasingly relieved of many of his duties relating to the US and Taiwan.253 Following 
Lee’s Cornell speech itself and China’s low-key response, the pressure on Jiang, in 
particular, to respond more strongly only increased. Jiang reportedly took responsibility 
for the delayed response time to Lee’s initiatives to expand Taiwan’s living space, but the 																																																								
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pressure kept on bearing down on Jiang for a stronger response.254 
Jiang Not At Ease in the CMC and PBSC: 
Unlike Deng or Mao, Jiang was on a more level playing field with his ‘peers’ in 
the Chinese leadership.255 Jiang had shown he needed to lead through consensus rather 
than being able to effectively drag the country in the direction he desired with only 
repeated coaxing. His weaker stature and reliance on consensus meant that unlike in the 
past, powerful individuals and organizations such as the PLA could now effectively exert 
strong influence on decisions made by the top leader of China. Even “though Jiang might 
still be in favor of the peaceful approach, it was more difficult for him to express it.”256 In 
this case “Jiang had to shift to the side of using military force in defending national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity because China’s powerful military leaders, ideologues 
and bureaucrats supported this tough position.”257 In the past, Deng had been able to, and 
in some cases had to, intervene even after Jiang became head of the CMC to calm the 
PLA. However, with Deng’s health deteriorating after 1992, there was no one who could 
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“overrule the PLA’s confrontation approach.”258 Following Jiang’s and Qian’s July self-
criticisms before the CMC, the PLA announced its first rounds of missile tests, military 
exercises, and even continued with its controversial nuclear tests.259  
Even organizations associated with the government, from the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences to the China Institute for International Economic Relations, opposed 
and seemed taken aback by the government’s harsh turn towards potentially dangerous 
coercive diplomacy.260 While these and other aforementioned government and 
government-affiliated organizations opposed what they saw as an unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous series of military actions, their voices were drowned out by more 
conservative ones clamoring for stronger action. According to some sources, the proposal 
for a missile test that would be one of the first military actions by China in the crisis was 
made while Jiang was not even in the country. Supposedly, the proposal was drafted by 
Li Peng (the premier whom Deng had chosen Jiang over to be the new top leader), 
Admiral Liu Huaqing, and General Zhang Zheng in response to several hundred letters 
from different departments of the PLA “requesting tougher actions to prevent Taiwan 
from seeking independence.”261 Regardless, it is known that the military exercises were 
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first proposed by members of the PLA and not by civilians.262 When Jiang arrived back in 
China, he was faced with such stronger demand from within the PLA, CMC, and PBSC 
that the matter was fait accompli and the missile test was performed.263  
Arguably Li, Premier and a member of the PBSC, and Liu Huaqing, the Vice-
Chairman of the CMC and a member of the PBSC, were the two most powerful men in 
China only after Jiang. Two other Jiang rivals in the PBSC, Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan, 
would eventually join the hoards of military and number of conservative civilian leaders 
in calling for an increasingly harder line.264 Their calls were taken as an implicit criticism 
of the moderate approach publically headed by Jiang.265 Given Jiang’s well-known nature 
as a political weathervane, it is not too surprising that once the PLA and civilian 
conservatives really started to bear down on him that he folded under such pressure and 
the military activities were announced and later increased.266  
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against these three formidable individuals even in an informal setting. Michael D. 
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as its budget requests. See Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, 
Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, 
	 100	
Gunning for Progress on Taiwan… with Missiles: 
The military activities that would make up the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis would 
be broken up in to the actives during 1995, after Lee’s visit to the US, and those activities 
during 1996, that occurred in the months leading up to the election in Taiwan. During the 
crisis China conducted mock invasions (including six war games involving 250,000 
troops in total) and tested its missile systems in the waters around Taiwan; however, it 
also did one thing with its air force, which was equally threatening in the eyes of the 
Taiwanese military but was less widely reported on.267 China sent warplanes to cross the 
line equidistant between China and Taiwan. This line had not been crossed by either 
side’s armed forces in years as part of a tacit understanding between them to reduce 
tension and suspicion over their military movements in the Strait. By crossing the line, 
China was showing it would start pushing on Taiwan’s strategic space in the Strait.268 
China’s closure of key international sea lanes during this time for its military activities, 
which was illegal under international maritime law, also raised the worrying specter of 
future violations of international law with potentially massive impacts on freedom of 
navigation and international trade.269 Turning key international ship lanes and key 																																																																																																																																																																					
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An Encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2012, p.445-446. Peter Nan-shong Lee, “Jiang 
Zemin versus Lee Teng-hui: Strained Mainland-Taiwan Relationship,” Maurice 
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international air corridors into a shooting gallery also interrupted commercial ships and 
flights in the region as they were either forced to delay their trips or to take alternate 
routes to avoid being caught in the hail of missiles and other projectiles.270 China’s 
decision to conduct its missile tests in the Taiwan Strait for the first time (all previous 
missile tests had been conducted in the central and western regions of China) was seen as 
another military ‘first’ for China which made its activities during the 1995-6 TSC 
especially threatening, and seem like more than just a normal threat display.271 
Coordinated Signal by a Unified Leadership or Example of PLA as a Pressure 
Group?: 
There are some who believe that the whole 1995-6 TSC was a case of coercive 
diplomacy carefully agreed on and planned out by a unified Chinese leadership. That 
view is understandable if one believes that the PLA is completely under the ‘absolute 
control’ of the CCP and that they are incapable of holding and advocating separate views 
that are not held or sanctioned by the Party. However, there is not consensus on this in 
the field, and while this might be the case with a few officers who are sanctioned to talk 
with the media, the idea that every individual in the then 2.9 million member PLA was 
following in lock-step or was in complete agreement with the CCP/civilian leadership 
(which was itself notably divided) is, statistically, nearly impossible.272 Not only do the 																																																								
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numbers alone strain credulity, the notion also removes any agency from members of the 
military and discounts the impact of a “military mind.” 
Even if those things were to be discounted and only the actions that took place 
during this timeframe were to be examined, it is still difficult to claim that the PLA was 
just a ‘hawkish signaling device’ of a CCP/civilian leadership. For a Chinese leadership 
to send a coordinated ‘carrot and stick’ signal with the civilians conveying the ‘carrot’ 
and the military the ‘stick’ from the beginning of the crisis, they would have had to be in 
agreement, but they were not. If the leadership was unified on a stronger stand from the 
beginning, its change in position would not have only come after significant public and 
private pressure from individual members as well as departments primarily from the 
PLA. Did Jiang Zemin order the thousands of officers and enlisted men who sent him 800 
angry letters a day to do so as part of a signal to Taiwan and the US?273 If the Chinese 
leadership was so unified, why was Qian, who had publically helped lead Jiang’s 
moderate approach, so publically and privately thrashed by the PLA? Why was the ‘soft’ 
approach pushed principally by Jiang and Qian so lambasted, primarily by the military?  
If Jiang and Qian were in such agreement with those pushing for a more militant show of 
force from the beginning, such as Li Peng and Liu Huaqing, why did Jiang and Qian have 
to make self-criticisms in government organizations under the strong influence of those 
favoring a more militant show of force?274 Given the history of such self-criticisms in 																																																																																																																																																																					
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274 Suisheng Zhao, “Changing Leadership Perceptions: The Adoption of a Coercive 
Strategy,” Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across The Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and 
	 103	
China, it is highly unlikely that Jiang and Qian would have performed them unless they 
were concerned about the consequences if they did not.  
A Chinese leadership unified from the beginning of the crisis on taking a stronger 
stand than the initial moderate one taken by Jiang would also not have fumbled its 
response as badly as China did. Not only did the sudden change in position come at the 
concern and surprise of some of their own organizations, but the sudden change in stand 
and then overreaction backfired rather spectacularly (as had the first two Taiwan Strait 
Crises), strengthened pro-independence, independence-leaning forces, and Taiwanese 
identity in Taiwan, as well as the US-Taiwan defense relationship.275 The quiet walk back 
of some of the moves against moderates after the crisis abated, such as stripping Qian of 
some of his responsibilities, and the later retiring of Admiral Liu from the PBSC and not 
replacing him with a uniformed member of the PLA, only reinforces the idea that the 																																																																																																																																																																					
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PLA was able to tap into this issue at this time and act as a pressure group during the 
crisis but once the crisis was over lost some of its clout.276  
Conclusion: 
A ‘unified’ Chinese leadership intent on sending such a closely coordinated signal 
from the beginning would not have done these things, but this Chinese leadership did. 
Because the exclusive training, experience, and responsibilities the PLA had, they had 
developed their own unique perspective from those of the civilian government; their own 
‘military mind.’ This ‘military mindset,’ distilled by growing professionalism and the 
bifurcation of the government, led to the PLA holding different viewpoints and policy 
preferences than many civilian leaders. By taking a stand, the PLA offered civilian 
leaders unhappy with Jiang’s moderate approach, a base of support along with the people, 
expertise, and equipment necessary to make a militant show of force a reality. Had there 
still been integrated leadership as in the Korean War, the PLA would not and could not 
have offered this, but the PLA in 1995 and 1996 did. The PLA went from just an army of 
relatively untrained and uneducated peasants in the Korean War to an educated, skilled 
force with its own unique perspective and corporate identity (in great part because of its 
professionalization and the bifurcation of elites) that could be courted to give political 																																																								
276 The MoFA similarly regained some of its former responsibilities. See John W. Garver, 
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support to different policies and by extension different factions. The PLA began to show 
that it could not just carry out policy but also influence it. In 1949 Mao said that the 
‘Chinese people had stood up,’ but in 1995-6 it was the PLA who stood up in Chinese 
politics, and the PLA made waves higher than those created by its plummeting missiles in 
the waters around Taiwan. 
To understand the next step in the evolution of the role of the PLA in Chinese 
foreign policy and behavior abroad moving forward from the 1995-6 TSC, the role of the 

















The South China Sea: The PLA Exercising Its Voice and 
Options Inside and Outside of Government 
One Government But Many Voices and Views:  
The PLA itself and civil-military relations in China more broadly have been 
changing. The bifurcation of the government and the professionalization of the PLA have 
led to the PLA developing some distinct interests from those of the CCP.277 Here, it is 
timely for foreign observers of China to remind themselves of the tendency of past 
foreign observers to paint the PRC as a monolithic, faceless entity, with all of its people 
in lock-step. The PRC is run by organizations with institutional interests that are in turn 
comprised of individuals who have their own differing viewpoints just as is true in any 
country. However, it is true that the internal divisions of the Chinese government on 
certain issues are becoming easier for outsiders to observe today as more organizations 
and individuals begin to increasingly voice their own interests.278  
In the 1995-1996 TSC, critical influence on China’s response to Taiwan was 
transferred from Jiang (as well as Wang Daohan and Qian Qichen) to another group 
within the upper echelon of the leadership through pressure led by the PLA and its allies. 
Today in the SCS, influence is being transferred not just away from the MoFA and 																																																								
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role of the army in China’s politics,” Briefing: June 2015, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, p.10.  
278 Cary Huang, “Death of a dove reignites China foreign policy debate: Wu Jianmin 
tackled hawkish PLA general and nationalistic newspaper editor,” South China Morning 
Post, June 24, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1979150/death-dove-reignites-china-foreign-policy-debate. David M. 
Lampton, “How China Is Ruled: Why It’s Getting Harder for Beijing to Govern,” 
Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014,  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-12-06/how-china-ruled. 
	 107	
moderates within the Chinese leadership, but in some ways away from much of the 
central civilian government itself.279 The PLA along with China’s maritime militias 
(CMMs), China’s maritime law enforcement agencies (CMLE), State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), provincial and department officials, and even privately owned fishing 
companies, are increasingly influencing and performing China’s policy and behavior in 
the SCS whether the central government in Beijing wants them to to the degree that they 
are or not.280 These groups are not the first to tread this path though, they are following in 
the decades old footsteps of the PLA, particularly the PLAN, who continues to lead the 
charge and primarily orchestrate the campaign for increased Chinese control of the SCS. 
The PLA took those first footsteps and have continued them because its 
professionalization and the bifurcation of government allowed it to. Combined with 
changes in the environment at home, the PLA has been able to more quickly evolve from 
a pressure group able to achieve short-term goals to a group capable of gather and leading 
allies and being the primary orchestrator of a long-term campaign for increased control 
over the SCS. 
PLA in a New Environment: CMI, Securitization, & the SCS:  
																																																								
279 Ryan D. Martinson, “Power to the Provinces: The Devolution of China’s Maritime 
Rights Protection,” China Brief, Vo.14, Is. 17, The Jamestown Foundation, September 
10, 2014, p.4-7. The central government of China has not just been losing its monopoly 
on effective control on China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad, but also its monopoly 
on capital, talent, and information control. See Ibid. 
280 By 2012, 70% of China’s distant water fishing companies were privately owned. See 
Tabitha Grace Mallory, “China as a Distant Water Fishing Nation,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, January 26, 2012, p.2. China has further 
categories for its state-owned and privately owned fishing companies. See Wen Qiuli, “
我国远洋渔业企业的竞争力分析,” 水产科学, Vol. 22, No. 6, November, 2003. 
	 108	
 The environment in China since 2009, but especially after Xi Jinping came to 
power in 2012, has become far more favorable to the PLA and its interests. Civil-military 
integration (CMI) and securitization at home has led to the PLA having increased access 
to resources as well as stronger links with potential allies and supporters. Meanwhile, the 
tension stemming from the SCS has served as an excellent rallying cry for a stronger 
military and supporting said military’s ideas over those of the increasingly mocked 
MoFA and moderates generally.281  
Xi has been pushing for deeper civil-military integration, as has the PLA.282 As 
was stated in China’s 2015 Defense White Paper, “in response to the new requirement 
arising from China's all-round and deepening reform, the armed forces will continue to 
follow the path of” CMI.283 The push for CMI has seen the PLA taking a more active and 
generally larger role in daily life in Chinese society, not just within the civilian 
government. If private citizens resist their own mandated role in ‘national security’ 
operations or those of the PLA or militias, they are being tracked down and punished. 
Private citizens (such as truck drivers) are being increasingly mandated to be involved in 
joint military-militia-citizen exercises. If these private citizens refuse to participate, as 
more than half chose to do for a Hainan transportation and joint logistics supply drill, 
police are sent to hunt them down and strict legal punishments are meted out.284 
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In line with “actively participat[ing] in the country's economic and social 
construction,” the PLA is now involved with nearly all infrastructure projects at some 
level, such as major roadways and ports, to ensure they suit military needs.285 Following 
passage of the Defense Transportation Law in 2016, the types of projects, at all levels of 
government, that the PLA now has at least a voice, if not hand, in has only grown.286 
Infrastructure is not the only thing being built in China that the military is increasingly 
involved in. As the People’s Daily announced on their official Twitter account in 2015 
“[a]ll new ships built in China have to be designed so they can be easily converted for 
military use: new policy by govt.”287 Ships specifically for China’s Coast Guard (CCG) 
are also being designed for easy conversion in navy frigates.288  Shipbuilders take their 
cues from the ship plans and military requirements of the now former PLA General 
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Armaments Department’s “Weapons and Armaments Development Strategy.”289 China’s 
state-owned shipbuilders, such as the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation this year, 
have also indicated that they will be increasingly “integrat[ing] its civilian and military 
businesses over the next five years.”290 There has been some pushback back by certain 
groups of civilians to the increasing intrusion, but there is little they can do against this 
tide of CMI and securitization of society.291 As the concept of taking a ‘holistic approach’ 
to national security gains momentum, the influence and participation of the military in 
previously purely civilian areas of society under the guise of CMI will continue and 
deepen under the push for greater CMI under the newer slogan of Military-Civilian 
Fusion (MCF).292 In the defense industrial context, MCF goes beyond traditional CMI as 
MCF also seeks to advance the “construction of a national infrastructure that connects the 
PLA, state-owned defense research, development, and manufacturing enterprises, 
government agencies under the State Council, universities, and private sector firms.”293 
 While not officially a part of the planned CMI as described in the 2015 Defense 
White Paper, the influence of the military even touches the promotions of civilians. 
Following the 18th Party Conference, a large number of people from China’s defense and 
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defense-related industries have been appointed to the CCP Central Committee and to 
high-level regional and party positions despite their lack of government- and party-
related qualifications. Although most of the people appointed in this trend are not 
members of the military by trade, as the China expert Willy Lam put it, they “owe their 
meteoric rise to the PLA’s fortunes – and they are attuned to policy-making that would 
benefit the military establishment.”294 Given their previous history with the military 
establishment and their continuing ties with said establishment, it seems logical to predict 
that their actions within their new posts will likely favor the military. 
While as discussed in previous chapters military education has rapidly evolved in 
recent decades, now under Xi national security education (equivalent of military 
education for civilians) has been expanded to more civilians, particularly more civilian 
government officials and strategically important Chinese businesses. The National 
Defense Education Program (NDEP), launched in 2013 and led by the CCP Organization 
Department and the PLA’s then General Political Department, expanded education on 
mobilizing and utilizing the civilian population for a ‘people’s war’ as expounded by 
Mao.295 Some SOEs have even brought in lecturers on their own to give a similar 
education to their leaders.296 The increasingly close relationship between the military and 
certain sectors of civilian government and businesses are important to keep in mind as 
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they strongly influence the current mindset of ‘China’ as it looks towards the SCS with 
organizations looking to cash in on China’s new moves.297 
China in the SCS Before 2009: 
 The dispute over control of much of the SCS has multiple dates of origin and 
continues to this day.298 The waters and physical features of the SCS are vast, resource-
rich, and sit on historic and modern trade routes. More often than not, pirates were the 
true masters of the area currently under dispute by states.299 China’s actions within the 
SCS, prior to 2009, can be described as consisting of coordinated, but relatively 
opportunistic, military moves alongside relatively uncoordinated, weak civilian moves. 
This situation began to change quickly in 2009 as the PLA, along with the allies and 
supporters it had accrued, began to coordinate their actions and enhance the capabilities 
of those performing said actions.  
How to Quietly Conquer a Sea: 
 China’s general strategy for increasing its area of control has been and can still be 
generally characterized as “non-violent expansion.”300 However, the increasing presence 
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of military assets and use of military and paramilitary actors by China has increasingly 
heightened the risk of escalation and violence breaking out. 
Figure 2: All Created Facilities Possessed By SCS Claimants in the Spratlys (http://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/) 
China now uses fishermen and China’s maritime militias (CMMs) as frontline scouts for 
foreign activity and to showcase China’s “historic control” of the SCS. The presence of 
Chinese economic activity in an area it “historically controls” then demands that it 
‘administer’ Chinese law in this area with CMLE, which in itself to a certain extent also 
legitimizes China’s claims of control.301 The PLA trains, coordinates, and occasionally 
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directly commands both the CMMs and CMLE in ‘incidents’ with foreign vessels. It also 
floats in the background menacing foreign vessels during ‘incidents,’ reminding everyone 
of the power of the Chinese military if they think of challenging China with violence. 
These three main government-controlled operators in the SCS (the PLA, CMLE, and 
CMMs) are extremely important as they are the most potent source of Chinese power in 
the SCS. The civilian supporters that have allied themselves with the campaign primarily 
orchestrated by the PLA in the SCS are also very important to understand. Without them, 
the campaign would not be as well-funded and would not have achieved a devolution of 
power, and by default China’s foreign policy, in the SCS away from the central 
government toward the provinces, as well as military and paramilitary actors.302 
The PLA: ‘Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain’: 
 The PLA has played a significant role in China’s behavior in the SCS prior to 
2009 such as in decisions to use force. The two most prominent cases, the 1988 push to 
occupy several features and the 1994 Mischief reef occupation, both occurred when the 
PLA was still under integrated leadership or its shadow, and therefore belong to older 
periods of civil-military relations and PLA development than this chapter is primarily 
concerned with.303 In order to focus on the changes that have occurred in the PLA’ s role 
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in China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad since the 1995-6 TSC, this chapter will 
focus primarily on the SCS from 2009 onwards as that was the big shift of China towards 
assertive behavior.304 It was also the year when China finally submitted its nine-dash line 
claim to the UN, so from that point onward there was more clarity with regard to what 
was officially being disputed.305 
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feat considering as late as 2001 China was only able to dredge 300 million cubic meters a 
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Figure 4: China's Nine-dash Line Claim vs. What It Is Likely Legally Entitled to Under International Law 
(source: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/a-national-strategy-for-the-south-china-sea) 
Due to the delicate nature of the situation in the SCS, the PLA is not operating in 
the same clear frontline, principal operator fashion as in the case studies of the Korean 
War (where they were fighting) and the 1995-6 TSC (where they were leading the charge 
for a military display of force and then physically displaying that message) though they 
do have a great role beneath the surface of China’s frontline actors (figuratively and, in 
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the case of submarines, literally).306 Although the PLA are the most powerful Chinese 
force that can operate in the area and although China has conducted the most military and 
paramilitary actions taken by any claimant (approximately more than the rest combined), 
many of China’s actions taken in the SCS have been, seemingly, non-military and non-
paramilitary.307 The PLA has agreed that using ‘civilian’ and paramilitary forces as the 
frontline operators is preferable for now given incomplete Chinese control over the area 
they claim and the gap in military capabilities between China and the US.308  
However, even in operations conducted abroad by seemingly by ordinary citizens 
or civilian CMLE agencies, the PLA often has played a key role. For example, China 
reorganized CMLE actors under a single agency, the State Oceanic Administration 
(SOA).309 Later, it was announced that such activities would be under the auspices of a 
new organization, the State Oceanic Commission (SOC), made up of the SOA and 
several other nominally civilian maritime and border organizations. It has been learned 
that the PLA (particularly the PLA Navy or PLAN) had been pressing the leadership to 
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centralize China’s previously disparate civilian agencies, in order to produce a 
coordinated campaign to advance Chinese control of the SCS.310  
While the PLA originally wanted to have formal direct control over the SOC, it 
has received much of what it wanted for China’s campaign in the SCS. Interviews 
conducted by Christopher D. Yung with relevant Chinese personnel also indicate that the 
PLA was an “important player in the planning and decision-making process” in the 
civilian centralized agency’s creation and that the PLA “supports the idea that civilian 
law enforcement vessels should be on the “front line” while the military is “in the 
rear.””311 PLAN assets remain involved despite China’s attempts to portray its efforts as 
civilian and peaceful. Many CMLE ships belonging to the China Maritime Surveillance 
fleet (one of the organizations that is now under the authority of the SOC) are actually 
decommissioned PLA ships.312 The SOA itself was originally affiliated with the PLAN 
before being place under the control of the State Council via its answering to the National 
Scientific Commission.313 Current PLA naval assets are also involved in the campaign, 
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and the PLA remains very much involved in the planning and coordinating of operations 
and with personnel and assets involved in the operations themselves as well.314  
 However, in addition to the PLA’s role as trainers, advisors, and sometimes 
commanders of the ‘civilian’ and paramilitary forces, they also work with the civilian 
officials and agencies that support the policy preferences the PLA has for the SCS 
(namely not giving up an inch of Chinese territory and pushing the limit of what China 
can get away with to further its control over areas it claims). These government officials, 
and even some SOEs, vigorously and loudly support the increasingly assertive campaign 
in the SCS. They often proclaim their support for the PLA and maritime militias and of, 
in fact, expanding their role and the support they give them. Speeches on building a 
‘Great Wall of Steel on the Sea’ and of how only by uniting with the military can they 
live in and expand the areas they occupy in the SCS.315 These individuals go beyond the 
worn out platitudes of the MoFA and of high-ranking central government leaders.  
Although the PLA has a less ‘frontline’ role (or at least less clearly frontline role) 
in China’s campaign in the SCS, it still wields influence through not only its own assets 
in the region and those it commands during operations, such as CMMs, but through its 
unique voice when speaking on matters of national security. The PLA, and particularly 
the PLAN lobby, is strongly responsible for the shift in thinking regarding the importance 
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of the seas to China that precipitated the growing focus on the country’s maritime 
disputes.316 Without the PLA, China would not be as focused as it is on any of its 
maritime disputes. Without the PLA’s earlier efforts, China’s leaders would also not have 
realized the benefits of installing a “sea or maritime consciousness” in the Chinese 
public, which they have been since trying to achieve.317  
The military has been leading the charge in making sure Chinese citizens (both in 
and out of the military) are aware of its far flung claims in other ways as well. In the past 
few years the PLAN has taken to holding oath-swearing ceremonies on disputed physical 
features in the SCS, such as Fiery Cross Reef.318 These ceremonies are a way, not only to 
showcase China’ control of these physical features, but also to inculcate a strong sense of 
duty within members of the military that they are China’s and it is their duty to protect 
them from foreign forces. If there was any doubt about the PLA’s view of the SCS or 
what recruits might be doing if they joined the PLAN, the August 2015 recruitment 
advertisement by the PLAN clears it up well. It makes the connection between China’s 
future rise and military strength. In between shots of missiles and guns being fired and 
majestic shots of the latest PLAN equipment, sometimes with the SCS in the background, 
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the commercial states: “China’s oceanic and overseas interests are expanding 
rapidly...our land is vast but we will not yield an inch of our territory to foreigners.”319 
Capturing Chinese Decision-making on the South China Sea: 
Although the end goal of complete control of all that China claims within the 
nine-dash line in the SCS is shared by government actors ranging from the MoFA to the 
PLA, how China goes about achieving that goal is where institutional interests and 
professional views start to divide such groups.320 Bifurcation of the government and 
professionalism of the PLA already pushed Chinese policy forward in the SCS in the 
early days with the push for aircraft carriers, the conquest of more physical features, and 
the construction on Chinese-controlled islands. The PLA’s ability to act as an interest 
group has only been enhanced due to the further development of professionalism within 
the PLA and bifurcation of the military from the civilian government.321  
The ability of the PLA has been further enhanced by the fact that of the eight 
factors that might interfere with the PLA’s ability to act as an coherent interest group set 
forth by John Garver in 1996, only three remain relevant today: rivalry between the 																																																								
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dominant ground forces and the navy, patronage or favoritism within the armed forces 
(which is also present in the rest of government), and links between interest sub-groups 
within the PLA, such as the PLAN, and civilian interest groups, such as the SOA. The 
other factors have since disappeared and are no longer potential limiting factors.322 The 
links between PLA sub-groups and civilian interest groups can actually often be 
considered a strength. Such links bring addition non-military support for policy 
preferences held by at least some branches of the military. Given China’s utilization of 
more military and paramilitary actions than the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and Taiwan combined (between 1995-2013), its ignoring UNCLOS and the Annex VII 
ruling against China, and the alarm that China’s actions have caused amongst Southeast 
Asia and even powers such as the EU and the US, it is clear that the more aggressive and 
assertive actions favored by the PLA have won out over the less disturbing diplomatic, 
legal actions favored by China’s doves.323  
 The PLA’s capture of the SCS issue is further seen in how it frames its budgetary 
requests and its role as the military of China. It has shifted its pitch for more resources 
from protecting China against wars to casting itself, and especially the PLAN, as the 
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protector of China’s economy.324 This shift in pitch likely has helped it continue to get 
significant annual on-the-books budget increases even during increasingly slow domestic 
economic growth.325 The PLA also knows how to pick its battles. Based on the higher 
frequency of articles it publishes focused on the Spratlys via its media outlets, it is far 
more focused on the SCS disputes than the East China Sea (ECS) dispute and more 
focused on the SCS than the CCP is.326  
																																																									
324 M. Taylor Fravel and Andrew Liebman, “Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving 
Interests and Potential Influence,” Philip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael 
Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (ed.), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, 
Evolving Roles, National Defense University Press, 2011, p.41 and p.75-76. 
325 Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “China’s Military Spending Swells Again 
Despite Domestic Headwinds,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2015, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/03/05/chinas-military-spending-swells-again-
despite-domestic-headwinds/. Bernard D. Cole, China’s Quest For Great Power: Ships, 
Oil, and Foreign Policy, Naval Institute Press, 2016, p.83. 
326 Ibid, p.45, p.49-50, p.52. M. Taylor Fravel, “The PLA and National Security 
Decisionmaking: Insights from China’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes,” Philip C. 
Saunders and Andrew Scobell (ed.), PLA Influence on China’s National Security 
Policymaking, Stanford University Press, 2015, p.264-265. 
	 124	
Figure 5 Spratlys: PLA Daily Versus People's Daily (1987-2005). Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, 
“Beyond the Moat: The PLAN’s Evolving Interests and Potential Influence,”	Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher 
D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (ed.), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, 
Expanding Roles, National Defense University Press, 2011, p.49.  
 
The focus of the military on the SCS rather than the ECS is also clear from the build of 
the three fleets of the PLAN: the North Sea Fleet (NSF), the East Sea Fleet (ESF), and 
the South Sea Fleet (SSF). The SSF is easily the largest of the three fleets and boasts 
China’s largest amphibious vehicle flotilla, newest nuclear-powered submarines, most 
capable conventionally powered submarines, most capable surface ships, and only 
aircraft carrier.327 Because the Senkakus under dispute in the East China Sea are covered 
by the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation, the PLA knows there is less of a role 
for it in the dispute, as their heavy involvement would be the factor that could most likely 
lead to a war.328  
Focusing on the SCS dispute has proven to be a very good move for the PLA as 
an institution. Focusing on the larger and richer SCS has allowed the PLA to gain more 
non-military allies and supporters. While there were likely multiple factors involved in 
the shift in China’s behavior, from perception of relative US strength to ‘seizing the 
moment,’ 2009 and 2010 were the years when “military outspokenness in the media 
became commonplace”.329 It should not be viewed as a coincidence then that China 
began its big shift towards a more aggressive and assertive posture in the SCS with more 
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focus and resources on the disputes in the SCS rather than the ECS during this time. The 
SCS has been an area of interest and concern for the PLA for decades, more so than for 
the CCP or much of the State. From 2009 onward it seems that the PLA and its civilian 
supporters and allies captured China’s policy and dominated its behavior on the waves.330  
 The capture of China’s policy and behavior with regard to the SCS by the PLA 
and its civilian allies has been to the consternation of other parts of civilian government 
as well as academia who have complained not only of being ignored but of being shut out 
of the ‘debate.’331 The growing ‘debate,’ or to be more accurate ‘division,’ within the 
Chinese government over its foreign policy has grown more prominent in recent years 
with China’s assertive actions in the SCS and ECS and its deteriorating relations with the 
US.332  
 The PLA’s role in and influence on China’s foreign policy and behavior currently 
is perfectly encapsulated by the SCS case study. The PLA been has pushing for a stronger 
stand in the SCS for decades. While it was under integrated leadership, it lacked both the 																																																								
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autonomy and capabilities to significantly enhance China’s control over the SCS. As 
integrated leadership was gradually weakened following Mao’s death and eventually 
ended in the mid-1990s with Deng’s death, the PLA as an increasingly cohesive interest 
group was able to use its enhanced knowledge and capabilities, which civilians’ lacked, 
to lead the Chinese leadership to approve policies and actions it preferred (military 
operations to conquer physical features, etc.) sometimes without even giving civilian 
leaders non-military alternatives.333  
When the PLA was only able to rely on irregular ‘incidents’ to help push the 
civilian leadership into action during that time, it was more difficult to make regular 
progress when there was not an imminent crisis that ‘demanded’ a military response.334 
Today, however, the PLA commands a stronger position within the government and has 
the capabilities to perform stronger actions more consistently then before.335 It has the 
military capabilities to effectively cower any claimant military (so long as the US does 
not get involved), and it operates in a nationalistic environment at home where everything 
is becoming securitized which gives the military a hand, voice, or at least eye in nearly 
every part of society in China. When its capabilities or domestic chest-beating are not 																																																								
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enough to either get enough of what it wants or can’t overcome the actions taken by other 
claimant states, it can turn to select sections of the government and the armed forces to 
‘go around’ opposition, even if that opposition is from other parts of government. Those 
it turns to for the SCS are CMLE and CMMs.  
CMLE: The Bouncer of the SCS:  
 CMLE is a collection of law enforcement agencies that enforce Chinese domestic 
laws in the waters and physical features China attempts to control and occasionally even 
in waters it does not formally claim.336 CMLE used to be a medley of agencies with 
overlapping duties and poor coordination.337 With the creation of the China Coast Guard 
(CCG) in 2013 under the SOA and later SOC, several separate agencies were formed into 
a united organization, so there are fewer competing agencies that make up CMLE at least 
in theory. The CCG is made up of the fleets formerly of China Marine Surveillance 
(CMS), China Fisheries Law Enforcement, Border Defense Coast Guard, and the 
Maritime Anti-Smuggling Police.338 Only the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) 
remains outside the CCG under the Ministry of Transport.339 
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 While the CCG is not apart of the PLA, it is a paramilitary organization whose 
creation was strongly influenced by the PLA and an organization where there is a 
“significant role for the PLAN in planning, coordination, and operations.”340 Ties 
between CMLE, particularly the CCG, and the PLA go further. The CCG utilizes PLA 
weapons and warships in its fleet. The presence of warships crewed by even a 
paramilitary organization like the CCG has allowed China to easily further outclass and 
often outgun the military, paramilitary, and maritime law enforcement (MLE) vessels of 
other claimant states in the SCS.341 The coordination with and cooperation by CMLE and 
CMMs with the PLA has enhanced its campaign to gain control of the SCS at the expense 
of the other claimants with their disparate forces.342  
Coordination between CMLE and CMMs goes so deep that on certain missions 
CMLE vessels will tag along with the CMMs and on other missions have CMLE 
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launching CMLE ships outfitted with weapons and tools clearly “designed to put to sea to 
confront foreigners” only increases the evidence of China’s coordinated effort in the 
SCS.344 In fact, China’s use of paramilitary forces as the ‘frontline’ in its campaign, led 
expert Christian Le Miere to coin the term “paragunboat diplomacy,” a poignant term 
given the role of “gunboat diplomacy” in China’s own history.345   
One distinct benefit of using CMLE on the ‘frontline’ is that like CMMs, CMLE 
is not subject to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) between the US and 
China, which means that they can be more ‘unorthodox’ in their words and actions 
toward the US, putting the US at a disadvantage as it has rarely had to deal with such 
tactics.346 Given that China’s “rights protection missions” are increasing in number and 
intensity with no sign that this trend will reverse, it is clear that China’s “paragunboat 
diplomacy” will only continue in the future.347 This claim is further supported by the fact 
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documents such as the 2001 and 2013 editions of the Science of Military Strategy as well 
as in numerous Defense White Papers.348 
CMMs: The ‘Wild Card’ 
 An increasingly crucial source of PLA influence in China’s foreign policy and 
behavior abroad is not even a PLA organization, strictly speaking. However, CMMs are 
under the PLA chain of command and are increasingly a source of PLA influence ‘on the 
waves’ as the actions these militias take are increasing in number and profile.  
 The PLA has long utilized maritime militias to make up for the roles or resources 
it lacked on the water. CMMs were used both before and after the KMT fled to Taiwan. 
Rather than disposing of these militias once the PLAN was formed, the PLA continued to 
utilize them against KMT and non-KMT adversaries, even during the 1974 Battle of the 
Paracels against Vietnam.349 This paramilitary tool is drawn from China’s fishing fleet, 
which as the world’s largest employs 14 million people or about 25% of the world’s 
fishing force.350 As of 2015, 200,000 fishing vessels made up the total force of CMMs.351 
The individual fleets of each CMM can be quite large, especially when compared to the 
MLE fleets of other claimant countries whose job it is to deal with their behavior. In 
February 2015, the Tanmen maritime militia alone had 786 vessels, although only 174 of 
those were classified distant-water vessels, that still means just one of CMMs could field 																																																								
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more vessels than the MLEs of the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
combined.352 
It is important to keep in mind the duel nature of CMMs as a paramilitary force 
that also serve commercial interests. These militias are made up mostly of civilian 
fishermen whom are trying to make a living on the sea, and given China’s voracious 
appetite for seafood and the subsidies supplied by various parts of the Chinese 
government (central and local), the surge in people seeking employment in fishing is 
understandable. 
	
Figure 6 Chinese Fisheries Production Compared to Other Major Asia-Pacific States and Increase in Motorized 
Chinese Fishing Vessels Over Time 
(http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324669104578205041179985354) 
																																																								
352 Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Frontier to Frontline: Tanmen 
Maritime Militia’s Leading Role Pt. 2,” Center for International Maritime Security, May 
17, 2016, http://cimsec.org/frontier-frontline-tanmen-maritime-militias-leading-role-pt-
2/25260. The combined number of MLE ships held by the MLEs of the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia is only 69. China alone in 2015 had over 200 MLE 
ships. For MLE ship numbers per country, see: The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and 
Missions for the 21st Century, The Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015, p.45. 
	 132	
However, they are by no means a helpless group of innocents being impressed into 
paramilitary service to form the frontline of China’s campaign. China’s fishing fleets, 
particularly its distant-water fishing fleets, are rather infamous for their voracious 
overfishing and run-ins with foreign MLE.353 Long-time civilian fishermen in CMMs are 
also joined by many former members of the PLA, which in the case of some militias are 
in fact given priority in the hiring process.354 Similar to how when huge numbers of 
troops are demobilized from the PLA and are often pushed towards the People’s Armed 
Police (PAP), demobilized troops are similarly pushed towards joining CMMs.355 
According to several high-ranking former members of at least two Asian navies, these 
former PLA members are not the only PLA presence on CMM ships, as current members 
of the PLA also reportedly are present to provide additional direction and control during 
operations.356 These and other recent changes are behind the increasing 
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professionalization and militarization of certain ‘elite’ maritime militias, such as the 
Sansha City Maritime Militia.357 
  The Chinese government provides numerous subsidies to encourage Chinese 
fishermen (even if not in a CMM) to fish farther away from China’s shores, especially in 
the disputed waters of the Spratlys.358 Those fishermen fishing in distant-waters have 
been found to be particularly reliant on subsidies to remain financial viable.359 Once 
Chinese fishermen join a CMM, they receive military training, including weapons 
training, commensurate with their paramilitary responsibilities.360 In addition, they can 
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received a Beidou satellite uplink if they don’t already have one, also heavily subsidized 
by the Chinese government, which enables Chinese fishing ships (regardless if they are in 
a CMM) to call for help from the PLA or CMLE ships or to report on the activities of 
foreign vessels.361 CMMs have also further enhanced China’s maritime domain 
awareness by also manning stationary “coastal defense militia outposts” (海防民兵哨所) 
which also house PLA’s People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs).362 
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 There is no complete tally for the number of CMMs, but it is thought to be over a 
thousand with them often set up as a “company” though they are a government 
supported, trained, and occasionally commanded militia force.363 CMMs are under the 
command of the PLA, mainly under the local PLA command structure (PLA Provincial 
Military District, Military Sub-District, and so on down the chain of command). At the 
local level they are under the People’s Armed Forces Departments. Control of CMMs is 
not purely military however; there is a civilian presence in the form of the locality’s party 
secretary simultaneously holding the position of first-party secretary position of the 
locality’s military committee.364 It should be noted that the level of involvement and 
influence of these civilians in such ‘military’ or ‘paramilitary’ positions can be limited 
given their other civilian government responsibilities and their limited military 
knowledge.365 Any unique views due to their civilian nature that these first-party 
secretaries may bring to their positions are further watered down, as they are responsible 
not to the civilian leaders above them but to the military authorities at the level above 
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their own.366 Because of the paramilitary nature of the CMMs, they are also under the 
supervision of the local defense mobilization commissions (part of the National Defense 
Mobilization Committee System), which also have similar civilian representation.367 
Civilian involvement in CMMs also comes through their supplying the militias with part 
of their subsidies for improved ships, communication and satellite equipment, fuel, and 
so on.368 
 Once they are part of a CMM, fishermen can be expected to perform a wide range 
of duties in addition to fishing in waters China claims but are disputed by other states. 
Reconnaissance and intelligence collection about the environment and actions of other 
states has been a key part of China’s efforts to counter potential moves of other states to 
reassert their sovereignty and control over the waters and physical features they claim.369 
CMMs can fill in the gaps in the capabilities of both the PLA and CMLE who have fewer 
vessels to ply these waters. CMMs have also provided invaluable logistics support to 
Chinese-controlled features by being more numerous, cheaper, and less politically risking 
than using China’s few dedicated supply ships.370 When China needs them for a specific 
‘mission’, CMMs come under the explicit control of either the PLA or CMLE.371 
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The exploits of CMMs grab headlines around the world and back home in China 
where civilian bureaucrats and political leaders use them to gain control of more 
resources to support these militias, which they see as serving their own interest or that of 
the country one way or another.372 Though CMMs are not fully apart of the PLA due to 
their mostly civilian makeup, they are, nonetheless, a paramilitary tool that the PLA can 
wield directly or support to further the policies and actions the PLA prefers for China to 
adopt with regard to the SCS. Finally, CMMs have the added result of bolstering China’s 
narrative that the vast area in the SCS that it claims are the traditional fishing grounds of 
its people and that any ‘unorthodox’ or extreme behavior of its ‘fishermen’ are just the 
actions of civilians motivated by patriotism, not as they really are “…irregular 
selectively-uniform-wearing forces controlled by the PLA through land-based military 
People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs).”373 The ability to ‘take off’ their military 
uniforms when a mission is done is a useful feature that China has and continues to use in 
order to advance its campaign for control across the SCS using “gray zone” warfare yet 
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Civilian Supporters: Allies of the Assertive Campaign in the SCS: 
Certain local, provincial, and central level civilian government entities are also 
vocally supportive of not only the current activities of CMMs (as well as those of the 
PLA and CMLE) in disputed waters but of expanding them in the future.375 Their own 
roles in supporting activities such as a maritime rights protection missions has grown 
since 2009 when the SOA began to try to get provincial level departments, particularly 
provincial level units of the then CMS to perform more missions and perform those 
missions increasingly farther from shore.376 These entities are also ‘putting their money 
where their mouths are’ and financing the continued and expanded actions of CMMs. 
These civilian government entities are most often led by officials whose administrative 
areas host or are heavily dependent on fishing such as Hainan, whose governor and 
Deputy Provincial Party Secretary, Liu Cigui, was the former Director of the SOA and 
whose former governor and Party Chief, Luo Baoming, have both played important parts 
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state-owned Baosha Fishing Corporation, He Jianbin, in 2012 aggressively advocated 
transforming more vessels of fishing fleets into CMM vessels. He specifically called for 
arming these vessels to create “a military force stronger than all the combined forces of 
all the countries in the South China Sea.”378 In a further tying of China’s maritime 
strength to its economic strength, several provinces, such as Hainan, Guangdong, and 
Guangxi, have gone a step further and released their own ‘Maritime Economic 
Development’ documents.379 The sentiment is similar to how the military, the PLAN in 
particular, has been advocating for greater budgetary resources by making the argument 
that a strong maritime force is necessary to protect China’s growing ‘blue economy.’380 
Those supporters and allies based on the Paracels and Spratlys are equally if not 
more vigorous in their defense and support of paramilitary and military activities 
designed to improve and expand China’s area of control in the SCS. The mayor of Sansha 
City, Xiao Jie, bragged that they had played an “irreplaceable role” with their building of 
more joint civil-military defense mechanisms, investing four million RMB in a joint 
civil-military defense command center, setting up more than 600 maritime militia, and 
effectively creating a ‘Great Wall of Steel on the Sea’ (海上钢长城) (wall of steel hull 																																																																																																																																																																					
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ships).381 He has stated that the only way to buildup China’s presence in the SCS is 
through joint civil-military efforts. That support for increased CMI was so great, that 
Sansha City was actually awarded the title of “National Double-Support Model City” in 
2016.382 While not apart of the PLAN lobby, these supporters are still apart of the broader 
maritime lobby, which the PLAN is apart of and has long led.383  
SOEs in the energy sector, such as the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), are also supporting the more assertive action primarily orchestrated by the 
PLA. CNOOC and other energy SOEs like it benefit from increased Chinese control over 
vast swaths of the SCS which will enable them to access the potentially vast hydrocarbon 
deposits there without as much competition from foreign energy companies who Chinese 
forces have harassed away.384 The Chinese forces that do that harassment are of course 
happily outfitted by China’s defense industry consisting primarily of SOEs. The defense 
industry in China has thrived with the increasing focus given to strengthening the military 
beginning especially in the mid- to late-2000s and paramilitary forces in the past couple 
of years. Since this increased focus and resulting buying spree, the “[r]evenues from the 
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ten leading state-owned defense corporations have increased by around 20 percent 
annually.”385 In fact this has been “the most productive and profitable run in its history 
fueled by generous state funding, pent-up domestic demand, and access to critical foreign 
technologies and know-how.”386 
The moves by the Chinese maritime and naval forces to protect island creation 
crews while they work has also led to other SOEs to cash in on the new ‘land’ and 
nationalist fervor, namely those associated with tourism. State-owned airlines such as 
China Southern Airlines and Hanian Airlines have offered flights to the disputed 
Mischief and Subi Reefs.387 As the infrastructure on the physical features controlled by 
China in the Paracels and Spratlys is improved upon, the number of civilian flights to 
both locations are set to increase. In fact, daily civilian charter flights have already begun 
from Haikou, Hainan to a joint military-civilian airport in Sansha City on Woody Island 
in the Paracels, ownership of which is also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan.388 Cruise 
ships have been even more popular, with routes by Princess Cruise, owned by the local 
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SOE Hainan Strait Shipping, expanding in recent years to encompass more disputed 
physical features.389 
The SOEs and their subsidiaries who own the dredgers actually performing most 
of the island creation in the SCS, also are likely supporters of the more assertive strategy 
of China’s, since they get work, military and paramilitary protection while they perform 
said work, as well as are able to wave the banner of nationalism which likely helps attract 
business within China.390 Companies like these know the domestic environment they are 
operating in and which key phrases are likely to help them. In an interview in 2015, an 
executive from Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), Huang Lingcai, proudly 
stated that the aircraft they were trying to get the CCG to purchase could “play an 
important role in…maritime operations that protect our rights and interests” and that 
“[s]uch aircraft have special and significant functions that are essential to maritime 
powers.”391 Some in the shipbuilding industry have done similar moves with China State 
Shipbuilding Corporation showing off a proposed plan for an ‘Underwater Great Wall’ at 
a public exhibition in China in late 2015.392 The project, a network of sensors designed to 
detect submarines, was billed as having the potential to “contribute greatly to future 
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Chinese ability to control the South China Sea.”393 Were the project built, it would be 
worth a fortune to the company. The companies that manufacture the ships for the PLA, 
CMLE, CMMs, fishing fleets, and dredgers are also likely firm supporters of China’s 
more assertive strategy in the SCS as it has been part of their financial salvation.394  
Considering before quite a few of China’s important shipbuilding companies were 
facing short orderbooks, they likely look very favorably on the new influx of orders, 
especially expensive military and paramilitary orders, given the global downturn in new 
commercial orders.395 Military and paramilitary shipbuilding also receives the “best 
funding, infrastructure, research institutes, designers, and workers. State-owned shipyards 
on the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s favored “white list” – the ones 




394 Gabriel Collins, “Foreign Investors and China’s Naval Buildup: Chinese shipbuilders 
are looking to international capital markets to fund their operations,” The Diplomat, 
September 9, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/foreign-investors-and-chinas-naval-
buildup/. Given that the estimated cost of one Type 054A, which China has decided to 
use as the “backbone of escort and patrol missions” to the SCS, is US$348 million, there 
is quite a bit of financial salvation to go around. See Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson, 
“The Type 054/054A Frigate Series: China’s Most Produced and Deployed Large 
Modern Surface Combatant,” China SignPost, August 2, 2015, 
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Figure 8 Falling Orders for New Shipping Vessels in Global Market (http://www.wsj.com/articles/cosco-china-
shipping-to-merge-shipbuilding-arms-1475688293) 
Such companies have also benefited from the financial securitization China’s government 
has encouraged among Chinese shipbuilders to allow for increased access to capital 
markets.397 If they had any doubts about the reasons for their own success and the 
importance of those reasons, then they need only look to companies such as Rongsheng 
Heavy Industries Group. The Group only had the capacity for filling commercial vessel 
orders, and so, faced with losses in 2013, had to ask the Chinese government for 
assistance.398 The end result of the increasingly close relationship between the 
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billion for naval buildup,” Reuters, September 11, 2013, 
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Shipbuilders that focus more or exclusively on commercial orders, particularly 
shipbuilders that are also privately owned, have largely been facing bankruptcy and 
closure. See Andrew S. Erickson, “Steaming Ahead, Course Uncertain: China’s Military 
Shipbuilding Industry,” The National Interest, May 19, 2016, 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/steaming-ahead-course-uncertain-chinas-
military-shipbuilding-16266?page=show. The need to diversify products, even by 
military-focused shipyards, was likely one of the reasons behind the Wenchong Shipyard 
producing two, at least nominally, fishing ships for the Sansha Maritime Militia. The first 
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shipbuilding industry and the campaign in the SCS has been improved financial standing 
for Chinese shipbuilding companies and improved ships particularly for the PLA, CMLE, 
and CMMs, which have enhanced the ability of China to contest sea control increasingly 
further from its shores.399 
Conclusion: 
 China has made impressive inroads in attaining control of the SCS over the years. 
The PLA, CMLE, and CMMs have all played their parts to attain a greater degree of 
control for China. Opposition maybe rallying against China in the South China Sea, but 
support for China’s military- and paramilitary-dominated campaign is growing within 
China.400 
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Militia,” Center for International Maritime Security, September 1, 2016, 
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Figure 9: Concern Territorial Disputes with China Could Result in Military Conflict 
(http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-
americas-image/pg_14-07-14_southchinasea_640px/) 
An increasingly professionalized PLA, which is growing more distinct in personnel, 
outlook, and interests from the more moderate civilian side of government, has been able 
to rally an increasing segment of Chinese civilian government, businesses, and private 
citizens to its preference for a stronger stand on China’s claims to ownership of the SCS. 
The PLA’s increased interactions with and in some cases increased influence or control 
of these other actors has also further enhanced the PLA’s power and influence with 
regard to the SCS due to the increasingly militarization of these entities, such as certain 
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CMMs, by the PLA.401 While in the past the PLA’s close relationship with the CCP/State 
gave it power in China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad, today it is the PLA’s 
increasing distance from the certain segments of the civilian government that give it both 
the authority to speak a different voice and rally others to its preferences and the 
capability to pursue the preferences it advocates. Given the recent actions by the PLA in 
the SCS with the further militarization of existing facilities and the apparent expansion of 
the area China seeks to control to now beyond the old Nine-Dash Line, it is increasingly 
clear the campaign long led by the PLA is advancing in the SCS and growing in strength 
at home.402 
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(nm) from Subic Bay, Philippines. The seize of the UUV was a violation of a litany of 
international laws and was done outside of China’s Nine-Dash Line. This action is not the 
first by Chinese actors outside of China’s Nine-Dash Line as Indonesia has had repeated 
problems with CMLE and Chinese fishing vessels in the waters around Natuna Island. 
These actions are given backing in statements by the MoND’s spokesperson calling the 
waters in which the PLA seized the UUV, “its waters.” See Xinhua, “China to hand over 
underwater drone to US in appropriate manner,” China Daily, December 18, 2016, 
http://m.chinadaily.com.cn/en/2016-12/18/content_27699934.htm. They also stated the 
US frequently carries out activities in ‘maritime areas facing China’ (中国当面海域). 
See Liu Shangjing (ed.), “国防部新闻发言人杨宇军答记者问,” 国防部网, December 
17, 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/info/2016-12/17/content_4767072.htm. The MoFA 
used the same phrase (‘maritime areas facing China’), but offered no explanation as to 
what it means. In another article from Chinese state-media, it claimed that the UUV was 
picked up in China’s SCS “jurisdictional waters” (管辖海域). See “美无人潜航器背后




This thesis is perhaps one of the widest chronological examinations of the 
evolution of the PLA in China’s foreign policy and behavior abroad to date. Focusing on 
the influence of professionalism and the bifurcation of the military and civilian sides of 
government, the PLA was tracked beginning with its days as a true party-army when at 
most levels the PLA and CCP were dominated by individuals who were simultaneously 
both ‘military men’ and ‘party men’, forming an integrated leadership. This integrated 
leadership formed essentially the one and only pillar of the communist movement in 
China and the early PRC. The shift from operating as a guerilla force seeking to bring 
down a government to becoming a government led to new duties for the PLA and CCP 
setting them on diverging paths.  
Following the setting up of the PRC and the disaster that was the Korean War, the 
PLA and the CCP/State began their gradual separation from each other. In order for each 
to perform their duties to the best of their abilities, special training and knowledge were 
required and provided by new exclusive educational systems for each. New criteria were 
soon developed for career advancement based on the demands of each new pillar of 
government. With increasingly less overlap in personnel, education, training, and career 
experience and the death of the old guard, integrated leadership crumbled. 
																																																																																																																																																																					
also claimed the waters where the UUV was seized were its “territorial waters.” See Hua 
Yiwen, “Op-ed: Underwater drone just a sample of US military action against China,” 
People’s Daily, December 19, 2016, http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/1219/c98649-
9156644.html. Combined with the assertion by US Admiral Scott Swift that China had 
created “so-called military zones” around the artificial islands China has created, it 
indicates that at the very least the importance of the Nine-Dash Line is waning and that as 
the reach of the campaign primarily orchestrated by the PLA in the SCS expands so too 
will what China claims and how fiercely it does so.  
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 By the time of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the government was facing 
the end of the integrated leadership, which had been forged in guerilla struggles that the 
new leadership had not faced. The result was a civilian leadership of a political party, 
whose legitimacy was under threat, having to interact with a rapidly professionalizing 
military that, while still at least a party-army in name, had other concerns than the CCP as 
an institution or its leader Jiang Zemin. At this time, the PLA was able to dominate the 
debate over how to respond to what they saw as provocations deserving a stronger 
response than what some of the civilian leadership had seen as sufficient. Rather than 
operating alone, the PLA was joined by a sub-set of civilians in government ready to 
follow the tougher stance propagated by the military. The PLA had difficulty maintaining 
this pressure in the long-term after the aggressive response backfired.403 This event, 
though a relatively short one, was a harbinger of civil-military relations to come.  
The South China Sea is the current zenith of the trend of the PLA working with 
civilians inside and outside of government to shift China’s foreign policy and behavior 
abroad in a direction they prefer over the objections of a not insignificant portion of 
civilian government. These objectors do not agree with the more assertive, if not 																																																								
403 The backfire, aside from bring two US aircraft carrier groups to the waters around 
Taiwan, led to increased ties between the US and Taiwan and led to the US viewing 
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the Presidential Election,” Brookings-FICS conference, May 23, 2004, p.4. Michael S. 
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dangerous, position China has taken and the increasingly nationalistic environment that 
has grown at home in part due to the new alliance and ties between the PLA, certain parts 
of civilian government, businesses, and some private citizens, especially since 2009 and 
later after Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. The behavior of the PLA in its interactions 
with civilians inside and outside of the central government may perhaps now be best 
described as a corporate allegiance modus operandi or mindset. The PLA, a corporate 
actor (corporate interests and attitudes), now has the ability to form alliances with sub-
sets or certain segments of the civilian government, businesses, and private citizens to 
achieve shared or mutually beneficial goals such as altering China’s policy and behavior 
in the South China Sea in the long-term. Their reasons may not all be the same but their 
desired end goal is as is the assertive manner in which they are willing to achieve it.  
The number of actors (both organizations and individuals) is enormous, and they 
are spread out over China and the South China Sea making coordination difficult; 
however, these actors are united by shared goals and means that keep them pushing 
China in the same direction, a direction first laid out by the PLA decades before the late 
2000s. The new modus operandi or mindset of the PLA’s is important for understanding 
how the disputes over the South China Sea will develop in the future. Should the civilian 
government be faced with another leadership crisis as it was around the time of the Third 
Taiwan Straight Crisis, based on corporate allegiance, it can be extrapolated that more 
civilians inside and outside of the central government, businesses, and private citizens 
would support and would help perform functions as apart of the more assertive posture of 
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